Jacobi’s Dare: McDowell, Meillassoux, and Consistent Idealism

Abstract

: Does Kant ’ s restriction of knowledge to phenomena undermine objectivity? Jacobi argues that it does, daring the transcendental idealist to abandon the thing in itself and embrace the “ strongest idealism ” . According to Bruno, McDowell and Meillassoux adopt a similar critique of Kant ’ s conception of objectivity and, more significantly, echo Jacobi ’ s dare to profess the strongest ideal-ism – what McDowell approvingly calls “ consistent idealism ” and Meillassoux disparagingly calls “ extreme idealism ” . After exposing the Cartesian projection on which Jacobi ’ s critique rests, Bruno shows that McDowell ’ s and Meillassoux ’ s critiques make the same projection. He argues that whereas McDowell offers an inconsistent alternative to Kant ’ s idealism, Meillassoux begs the question against it. Finally, Bruno sketches the account of objectivity that follows from Kant ’ s distinction between general and transcendental logic.