Open Definitions of the Common Good

C. Engel
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Abstract

Doesn't work. Has failed. Apolitical. Naive. Pre-modern. Non-scientific. Such hardly ornamental epithets get pinned on anybody who still sets out to define the common good today. Ideas and interests cannot be translated into one another without fracture. There is no abstract basic norm from which all normative decisions could be deduced. But neither the individual, nor society and the state can forego a definition of the common good. The ostensive a priori dissolves when a closed definition of the common good is exchanged for an open one. A definition of the common good cannot claim validity once and for all, but always just for one time. Such openness is able to be created with numerous decision-making techniques. The co-existence of incommensurable ideas can be organized through differentiation. Institutions can keep the struggle between conflicting ideas open over the long run. Or decisions and reasons break up. It is easier if the conflict is only settled for the concrete circumstance to be decided upon. Sometimes there is even agreement in the concrete case about the reasons on which a decision is based; more often in any case there is agreement about the decision itself. The plasticity of the definition of the problem can also be used. The need for a decision for which no reasons can be given does not completely disappear with any of these techniques. However, it does diminish. And if it does come to such a decision, that decision is more controlled.
公共利益的开放定义
是行不通的。已经失败了。不关心政治的。天真。前现代的。非科学。如今,任何一个仍试图定义共同利益的人都会被贴上这样的标签。思想和兴趣不可能相互转化而不产生裂痕。没有一个抽象的基本规范可以用来推导出所有的规范性决定。但是个人、社会和国家都不能放弃对共同利益的定义。当公共利益的一个封闭的定义被一个开放的定义所取代时,先天的指涉就消失了。公共利益的定义不能一劳永逸,而只能在某一时期有效。这种开放性可以通过多种决策技术来实现。不可通约观念的共存可以通过分化来组织。从长远来看,制度可以使相互冲突的思想之间的斗争保持开放。或者决定和理由破裂。如果只有在具体情况确定后才能解决冲突,情况就会容易一些。有时,在具体案例中,人们甚至对一项决定所依据的理由达成了一致;在任何情况下,更多的是对决策本身达成一致。定义问题的可塑性也可以用。对于无法给出理由的决策的需求并没有因为这些技术而完全消失。然而,它确实减少了。如果真的做出了这样的决定,这个决定就会更受控制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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