As Certain as Debt and Taxes: Estimating the Tax Sensitivity of Leverage from Exogenous State Tax Changes

Florian Heider, Alexander Ljungqvist
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引用次数: 101

Abstract

We use a natural experiment in the form of 121 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states to show that tax considerations are a first-order determinant of firms' capital structure choices. Over the period 1990-2011, firms increase long-term leverage by 104 basis points on average (or $32.5 million in extra debt) in response to an average tax increase of 131 basis points. Contrary to static trade-off theory, the tax sensitivity of leverage is asymmetric: firms do not reduce leverage in response to tax cuts. Using treatment reversals, we find this to be true even within-firm: tax increases that are later reversed nonetheless lead to permanent increases in a firm's leverage - an unexpected and novel form of hysteresis. Our findings are robust to various confounds such as unobserved variation in local business conditions, union power, or unemployment risk. Treatment effects are heterogeneous and confirm the tax channel: tax sensitivity is greater among profitable and investment-grade firms which respectively have a greater marginal tax benefit and lower marginal cost of issuing debt.
与债务和税收一样确定:估计外源性国家税收变化对杠杆的税收敏感性
我们使用了一个自然实验,以美国各州企业所得税税率的121个交错变化的形式来表明,税收考虑是企业资本结构选择的一阶决定因素。在1990年至2011年期间,企业的长期杠杆平均增加了104个基点(或3250万美元的额外债务),以应对平均131个基点的税收增长。与静态权衡理论相反,杠杆的税收敏感性是不对称的:企业不会因减税而降低杠杆。使用治疗逆转,我们发现即使在公司内部也是如此:税收增加后来被逆转,仍然会导致公司杠杆的永久性增加——这是一种意想不到的、新颖的滞后形式。我们的研究结果对于各种混杂因素(如当地商业条件、工会力量或失业风险等未观察到的变化)都是稳健的。处理效果是异质的,并证实了税收渠道:盈利级和投资级公司的税收敏感性更大,它们分别具有更高的边际税收效益和更低的边际发行债务成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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