The Resilience of Noxious Doctrine: The 2016 Election, the Marketplace of Ideas, and the Obstinacy of Bias

Leonard M. Niehoff, Deeva Shah
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The Supreme Court has recognized the central role that free expression plays in our democratic enterprise. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Abrams, Justice Holmes offered a theory of how free expression advances our search for truth and our cultivation of an informed electorate. That model—often called the “marketplace of ideas,” based upon the metaphor used by Holmes—has proven to be one of the most persistent and influential concepts in First Amendment jurisprudence. The marketplace of ideas model essentially holds that free expression serves our democratic goals by allowing differing proposed truths and versions of the facts to compete with each other for acceptance. The theory maintains that the best ideas and the most reliable information will emerge and prevail. The well-informed electorate that results from this process will then make better decisions in our participatory democracy. During the 2016 presidential election, however, it became apparent that a number of statements made by then-candidate Donald Trump proved difficult to rebut in the public dialogue, even though they were clearly and demonstrably false. Of particular concern, some of those statements fed into biases against and stereotypes of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and women. This disinformation stubbornly resisted efforts at correction. This Article discusses the marketplace of ideas model and its underlying assumptions about how human beings process information and make decisions. It then proceeds to explain, through recent social science research, why the dynamic envisioned by the marketplace of ideas theory often fails to provide an effective counter-narrative to statements that reinforce racial, ethnic, religious, and gender biases and stereotypes. The Article concludes with some necessarily preliminary and exploratory thoughts about potential curative measures.
有害教义的恢复力:2016年大选、思想市场和偏见的顽固
最高法院已经认识到言论自由在我们的民主事业中所起的核心作用。在“美国诉艾布拉姆斯案”(United States v. Abrams)的反对意见中,霍姆斯大法官提出了一种理论,说明自由表达如何促进我们对真理的追求和对知情选民的培养。根据福尔摩斯的比喻,这种模式通常被称为“思想市场”,已被证明是第一修正案法学中最持久、最具影响力的概念之一。思想市场模式本质上认为,通过允许不同的提出的真理和事实的版本相互竞争以获得接受,自由表达有助于我们的民主目标。该理论认为,最好的想法和最可靠的信息将出现并盛行。从这一过程中产生的消息灵通的选民将在我们的参与式民主中做出更好的决定。然而,在2016年总统大选期间,很明显,当时的候选人唐纳德·特朗普发表的一些言论在公开对话中很难反驳,尽管这些言论显然是错误的。特别令人关切的是,其中一些言论助长了对种族、族裔和宗教少数群体和妇女的偏见和刻板印象。这种虚假信息顽固地抵制纠正的努力。本文讨论了思想市场模型及其关于人类如何处理信息和做出决策的基本假设。然后,通过最近的社会科学研究,解释了为什么思想市场理论所设想的动态往往不能为强化种族、民族、宗教和性别偏见和刻板印象的陈述提供有效的反叙述。文章最后对潜在的治疗措施进行了一些必要的初步和探索性思考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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