{"title":"Introduction: The UK’s Tilt to the Indo-Pacific","authors":"J. Gaskarth","doi":"10.1080/03071847.2022.2160594","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This special feature emerged from a workshop on the UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific, organised by the Open University and the Council on Geostrategy and involving academics as well as UK government officials. It aims to unpack the assumptions of the 2021 Integrated Review and to offer practical insights into the opportunities and challenges of the UK’s future engagement with the region. British foreign policy post-Brexit has characteristically focused on partnerships, minilaterals and looser forms of multilateralism. This feature examines the practicalities of this approach, in terms of the networks with which the UK is engaging, its bilateral partnerships with three key actors in the region (the US, Japan and Australia), its security commitments in the region, and relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As such, the authors aim to provide a broad assessment of how the ‘tilt’ is operating, and its future prospects, from networked, bilateral, minilateral and multilateral viewpoints. In my piece, I argue that what underpins much of the strategic logic and effort of the Indo-Pacific tilt is the existence of networks in world politics. The Integrated Review’s stated aims and objectives are reasonable but to achieve them will require a more sophisticated and rigorous analysis of the social dynamics of regions such as the Indo-Pacific, as revealed by social network analysis. John F Bradford provides an analytical history of the UK tilt to the Indo-Pacific from a US perspective. He traces UK engagement with the US in the region to 2007, when a Royal Naval officer was brought into its Pacific Command HQ, and charts how this deepened as the UK began to engage more with Japan. Early involvement was focused on naval cooperation, scaling up to the deployment of the Carrier Strike Group in 2021. According to Bradford, this has been welcomed by the US as making an important contribution to gap filling during the Afghanistan evacuation; but he argues the tilt has not been sold to US policymakers by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and there is still a level of ignorance about what it entails. Ian Hall’s contribution looks at UK–Australia relations, particularly the prospects for AUKUS – the new agreement between Canberra, London and Washington. Hall sees the chance of a ‘substantive strategic partnership between Australia and the UK, underpinned by shared concerns about China’. His historical account notes a deep-seated fear of abandonment and insecurity in Australian strategic culture, which still taints relations between the two countries. From 2011, AUKMIN dialogues have provided an annual forum for discussion and AUKUS has accelerated technological cooperation; however, Hall notes that political will and conscious effort will be needed to identify and build links between the two countries.","PeriodicalId":221517,"journal":{"name":"The RUSI Journal","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The RUSI Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2022.2160594","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This special feature emerged from a workshop on the UK’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific, organised by the Open University and the Council on Geostrategy and involving academics as well as UK government officials. It aims to unpack the assumptions of the 2021 Integrated Review and to offer practical insights into the opportunities and challenges of the UK’s future engagement with the region. British foreign policy post-Brexit has characteristically focused on partnerships, minilaterals and looser forms of multilateralism. This feature examines the practicalities of this approach, in terms of the networks with which the UK is engaging, its bilateral partnerships with three key actors in the region (the US, Japan and Australia), its security commitments in the region, and relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As such, the authors aim to provide a broad assessment of how the ‘tilt’ is operating, and its future prospects, from networked, bilateral, minilateral and multilateral viewpoints. In my piece, I argue that what underpins much of the strategic logic and effort of the Indo-Pacific tilt is the existence of networks in world politics. The Integrated Review’s stated aims and objectives are reasonable but to achieve them will require a more sophisticated and rigorous analysis of the social dynamics of regions such as the Indo-Pacific, as revealed by social network analysis. John F Bradford provides an analytical history of the UK tilt to the Indo-Pacific from a US perspective. He traces UK engagement with the US in the region to 2007, when a Royal Naval officer was brought into its Pacific Command HQ, and charts how this deepened as the UK began to engage more with Japan. Early involvement was focused on naval cooperation, scaling up to the deployment of the Carrier Strike Group in 2021. According to Bradford, this has been welcomed by the US as making an important contribution to gap filling during the Afghanistan evacuation; but he argues the tilt has not been sold to US policymakers by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and there is still a level of ignorance about what it entails. Ian Hall’s contribution looks at UK–Australia relations, particularly the prospects for AUKUS – the new agreement between Canberra, London and Washington. Hall sees the chance of a ‘substantive strategic partnership between Australia and the UK, underpinned by shared concerns about China’. His historical account notes a deep-seated fear of abandonment and insecurity in Australian strategic culture, which still taints relations between the two countries. From 2011, AUKMIN dialogues have provided an annual forum for discussion and AUKUS has accelerated technological cooperation; however, Hall notes that political will and conscious effort will be needed to identify and build links between the two countries.
这篇专题文章来自英国向印度-太平洋地区倾斜的研讨会,该研讨会由开放大学和地缘战略委员会组织,学者和英国政府官员都参加了会议。它旨在揭示2021年综合评估的假设,并就英国未来与该地区接触的机遇和挑战提供实际见解。英国脱欧后的外交政策一贯侧重于伙伴关系、多边主义和更宽松形式的多边主义。本专题从英国参与的网络、与该地区三个关键角色(美国、日本和澳大利亚)的双边伙伴关系、其在该地区的安全承诺以及与东南亚国家联盟(东盟)的关系等方面考察了这种方法的实用性。因此,作者的目标是从网络化、双边、多边和多边的角度对“倾斜”如何运作及其未来前景进行广泛评估。在我的文章中,我认为支撑印度-太平洋倾斜的战略逻辑和努力的是世界政治中网络的存在。《综合评估》提出的目标和目标是合理的,但要实现这些目标,就需要对印太等地区的社会动态进行更复杂、更严格的分析,正如社会网络分析所揭示的那样。约翰•F•布拉德福德(John F Bradford)从美国的角度分析了英国向印度-太平洋地区倾斜的历史。他将英国与美国在该地区的接触追溯至2007年,当时一名英国皇家海军军官被调入其太平洋司令部总部,并描绘了随着英国开始与日本更多接触,这种接触是如何加深的。早期参与的重点是海军合作,扩大到2021年部署航母打击群。布拉德福德表示,美国对此表示欢迎,认为这为填补阿富汗撤离期间的空缺做出了重要贡献;但他辩称,英国外交、联邦和发展部(Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)并未向美国政策制定者推销这种倾斜,而且人们对其后果仍有一定程度的无知。伊恩·霍尔的文章着眼于英澳关系,特别是澳大利亚、伦敦和华盛顿之间的新协议AUKUS的前景。霍尔看到了“澳大利亚和英国之间的实质性战略伙伴关系,以共同关注中国为基础”的机会。他的历史叙述指出,澳大利亚战略文化中存在着一种根深蒂固的对被抛弃的恐惧和不安全感,这种恐惧仍然影响着两国关系。从2011年开始,AUKMIN对话提供了一个年度讨论论坛,AUKUS加快了技术合作;然而,霍尔指出,需要政治意愿和有意识的努力来确定和建立两国之间的联系。