25. SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1965-2000

A. Platt
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Just from a Christian standpoint, you can't see one of these and not consider that maybe it's not right. --Jim Willet, warden of Huntsville prison in Texas, after supervising 40 executions in one year (Rimer, 2000a) We're Number One! FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT WAS NOT A CONTESTED issue in the 2000 presidential race. By the end of Clinton's second term, the Democratic and Republican platforms shared the same premises about law and order, and disagreed only on details. Unlike Michael Dukakis in the 1988 campaign, Bill Clinton made sure in 1992 that he would not be labeled a "card-carrying member of the ACLU" or represented as the kind of governor who releases a Willie Horton into a work furlough program. While governor of Arkansas, Clinton approved the death penalty and as a presidential candidate he accused Republicans of being soft on crime. During the 1994 midterm election campaign, President Clinton supported a "three strikes" provision in a federal crime bill (Cole, 1999: 147). George W. Bush arrives in office with a record of presiding over a state with the second largest prison population and almost half the executions carried out in the country in 2000. The recent presidential election may have been in doubt for several weeks, but as far as criminal justice policies are concerned, it made little difference which party triumphed. By 1992, the traditional liberal agenda on crime -- prevention, community development, rehabilitation, and abolition of the death penalty -- had, like liberalism itself, disappeared from official political discourse, to be replaced by a bipartisan consensus of demagoguery. In 2000, Republicans and Democrats echoed each other's position: Clinton and Gore "fought for and won the biggest anti-drug budgets in history.... They funded new prison cells, and expanded the death penalty for cop killers and terrorists.... But we have just begun to fight the forces of lawlessness and violence," called the Democrats. "We renew our call," the Republicans responded, "for a complete overhaul of the juvenile justice system that will punish juvenile offenders" and for "no-frills prisons" for adults (Democratic National Convention, 2000; Republican Na tional Convention, 2000). Meanwhile, given the rush to retribution, most people would not know that people's safety is for the most part unrelated to the number of police or severity of punishment; or that most crime is not even reported to the police; or that the overall crime rate has declined over the last 20 years. The drop in the crime rate in the 1990s resulted from a complex interplay of demographic, economic, and social factors. Even mainstream criminologists admit that imprisonment and more punitive sentencing accounted for only five to 25% of the decline in crime (Butterfield, 2000b). According to a recent New York Times survey, 10 of the 12 states without capital punishment have homicide rates below the national average; and during the last 20 years, the homicide rate in states with the death penalty has been 48 to 101% higher than in states without the death penalty (Bonner and Fessenden, 1999: 1). When the law-and-order campaign was at its height in the early 1990s, the rates for murder and rape were high, but about the same as in the early 1970s; other crimes of violence, such as robbery and assault, had declined; and youth violence was a small and decreasing part of serious crime in the United States. [1] Victimization rates in 1999, reports the Department of Justice, are the lowest recorded since the National Crime Victimization Survey's creation in 1973 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999). Yet, by the early 1990s, a moral panic about crime and lawlessness was in full swing throughout the country, from Puerto Rico, where the National Guard was called upon to police housing projects, to the beaches of southern California, where curfews were imposed to prevent gang violence, and to Florida, where state politicians proposed reducing the age of execution to 14 and fining welfare mothers for their kids' crimes (Navarro, 1994: 6; Rimer, 1994: 1; Rohter, 1994: 10). …
25. 社会不安全感:美国刑事司法的转型,1965-2000
仅仅从基督徒的角度来看,你不可能看到其中一个,而不认为它是不对的。——吉姆·威利特(Jim Willet),德克萨斯州亨茨维尔监狱的典狱长,在一年内监督了40次处决之后(Rimer, 2000)。这是多年来第一次,在2000年的总统竞选中,罪与罚没有成为一个有争议的问题。在克林顿第二任期结束时,民主党和共和党的政纲在法律和秩序方面有相同的前提,只是在细节上存在分歧。与1988年竞选时的迈克尔·杜卡基斯(Michael Dukakis)不同,比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)在1992年确保自己不会被贴上“美国公民自由联盟(ACLU)正式成员”的标签,也不会被说成是那种让威利·霍顿(Willie Horton)这样的人进入工作休假计划的州长。在担任阿肯色州州长期间,克林顿赞成死刑。作为总统候选人,他指责共和党对犯罪软弱。在1994年中期选举期间,克林顿总统支持联邦犯罪法案中的“三振出局”条款(Cole, 1999: 147)。乔治•w•布什(George W. Bush)上任时的记录是,他领导的这个州的监狱人口居世界第二,2000年执行的死刑几乎占全国的一半。最近的总统选举可能已经持续了几个星期,但就刑事司法政策而言,哪个政党获胜并没有什么不同。到1992年,传统的自由主义关于犯罪的议程——预防、社区发展、改造和废除死刑——就像自由主义本身一样,已经从官方政治话语中消失,取而代之的是两党共识的煽动。2000年,共和党人和民主党人相互呼应:克林顿和戈尔“争取并赢得了历史上最大的禁毒预算....”他们资助了新的监狱牢房,扩大了对杀害警察和恐怖分子的死刑....但我们才刚刚开始与无法无天和暴力势力作斗争。”“我们再次呼吁,”共和党人回应道,“对青少年司法系统进行全面改革,以惩罚少年犯”,并为成年人建立“无装饰的监狱”(民主党全国代表大会,2000;共和党全国代表大会,2000年)。同时,由于急于报复,大多数人不会知道,人们的安全在很大程度上与警察的数量或惩罚的严重性无关;或者大多数犯罪甚至没有向警方报告;或者在过去的20年里,总体犯罪率有所下降。20世纪90年代犯罪率的下降是人口、经济和社会因素复杂相互作用的结果。即使是主流的犯罪学家也承认,监禁和更严厉的判决只占犯罪率下降的5%到25% (Butterfield, 2000)。根据《纽约时报》最近的一项调查,在12个没有死刑的州中,有10个州的谋杀率低于全国平均水平;在过去20年中,有死刑的州的凶杀率比没有死刑的州高48%至101% (Bonner和Fessenden, 1999: 1)。当法律和秩序运动在20世纪90年代初达到顶峰时,谋杀和强奸率很高,但与20世纪70年代初大致相同;其他暴力犯罪,如抢劫和殴打,有所下降;青少年暴力在美国严重犯罪中所占比例很小,而且在不断下降。司法部报告说,1999年的受害率是自1973年全国犯罪受害调查开始以来的最低记录(司法统计局,1999年)。然而,到20世纪90年代初,犯罪和无法无天的道德恐慌在全国范围内全面蔓延,从波多黎各,国民警卫队被要求监督住房项目,到南加州的海滩,实行宵禁以防止帮派暴力,以及佛罗里达州,该州政治家提议将死刑年龄降至14岁,并对儿童犯罪的福利母亲处以罚款(纳瓦罗,1994:6;Rimer, 1994: 1;罗特,1994:10)。…
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