European Safe Assets: Past, Present, and Future

S. Grund, M. Waibel
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

During and in the aftermath of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, many considered a common safe asset as a necessary condition for a stable European monetary union (EMU). However, intellectual efforts had far outstripped tangible policy action, until the pandemic turned the political debate upside down. Even though euro area governments agreed on the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a lender-of-last resort to members of the currency union, a mechanism for (substantial) joint borrowing has been absent to date, as has been common deposit insurance, common unemployment insurance or other automatic stabilizers. In short, EMU suffers from the congenital defect of a lack of significant fiscal capacity. Against this backdrop, this Chapter investigates the past, present, and future of safe assets in the EU. It is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews past borrowing programs and the safe assets these have produced. We show that the NGEU’s financing mechanism is not new; rather it is a scaled-up version of past EU borrowing programs. The Section also discusses the euro area’s two borrowing mechanism via separate supranational issuer: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Section 3 zooms in on the legal aspects of EU safe assets, highlighting both commonalities and differences between the various debt issuance programs and analyzing the pertinent legal features of the debt instruments the EU has relied on. Section 4 concludes.
欧洲安全资产:过去、现在和未来
在欧元区主权债务危机期间和之后,许多人认为共同安全资产是稳定欧洲货币联盟(EMU)的必要条件。然而,智力上的努力远远超过了实际的政策行动,直到大流行使政治辩论颠倒过来。尽管欧元区各国政府同意建立欧洲稳定机制(ESM),作为货币联盟成员国的最后贷款人,但迄今为止还没有一个(实质性的)联合借款机制,就像共同存款保险、共同失业保险或其他自动稳定机制一样。简而言之,欧洲货币联盟的先天缺陷是缺乏显著的财政能力。在此背景下,本章将探讨欧盟安全资产的过去、现在和未来。它的结构如下。第二节回顾了过去的借贷计划和这些计划产生的安全资产。我们表明,NGEU的融资机制并不是新的;相反,它是过去欧盟借款计划的放大版。本节还讨论了欧元区通过独立的超国家发行人的两种借款机制:欧洲金融稳定基金(EFSF)和欧洲稳定机制(ESM)。第3节将重点放在欧盟安全资产的法律方面,突出了各种债务发行方案之间的共同点和差异,并分析了欧盟所依赖的债务工具的相关法律特征。第四节总结。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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