Multi-Product Duopoly with Cross-Product Cost Interdependencies

Gary Biglaiser, Andrei Hagiu
{"title":"Multi-Product Duopoly with Cross-Product Cost Interdependencies","authors":"Gary Biglaiser, Andrei Hagiu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2634175","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Many multi-product firms incur a complexity fixed cost when offering different product lines in different quality tiers relative to the case when offering all products lines in the same quality tier (high or low). Such fixed costs create an interdependency between firms' choices of quality tiers across different product lines, even when demands are independent. We investigate the effects of this interdependency on equilibrium profits in a Stackelberg duopoly game. Both firms' profits are (weakly) higher when the complexity cost is infinite than when it is 0. The Stackelberg leader's profits are always (weakly) higher with a positive complexity fixed cost, but its profits can be non-monotonic in the magnitude of this cost. The Stackelberg follower's profits can be lower when the complexity fixed cost is positive than when it is equal to 0.","PeriodicalId":226335,"journal":{"name":"POL: Profit Maximization (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"POL: Profit Maximization (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2634175","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Many multi-product firms incur a complexity fixed cost when offering different product lines in different quality tiers relative to the case when offering all products lines in the same quality tier (high or low). Such fixed costs create an interdependency between firms' choices of quality tiers across different product lines, even when demands are independent. We investigate the effects of this interdependency on equilibrium profits in a Stackelberg duopoly game. Both firms' profits are (weakly) higher when the complexity cost is infinite than when it is 0. The Stackelberg leader's profits are always (weakly) higher with a positive complexity fixed cost, but its profits can be non-monotonic in the magnitude of this cost. The Stackelberg follower's profits can be lower when the complexity fixed cost is positive than when it is equal to 0.
跨产品成本相互依赖的多产品双寡头垄断
许多多产品公司在提供不同质量层次的不同产品线时,相对于提供相同质量层次(高或低)的所有产品线时,会产生复杂的固定成本。即使需求是独立的,这样的固定成本也使得公司在不同产品线的质量等级选择之间产生了相互依赖关系。我们研究了这种相互依赖对Stackelberg双寡头博弈中均衡利润的影响。当复杂性成本为无穷大时,两家公司的利润(弱)都比复杂性成本为0时高。当复杂性固定成本为正时,Stackelberg领导者的利润总是(弱)更高,但其利润在该成本的大小上可以是非单调的。当复杂性固定成本为正时,Stackelberg追随者的利润可能低于复杂性固定成本为0时的利润。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信