Lossy utility based outage compensation in Next Generation Networks

Abstract

Next generation networks (NGN) are envisaged to offer ubiquitous service access to roaming users across network boundaries. However, dynamic network conditions such as link failure, traffic congestion and so on prevailing in the network limits the provisioning of such uninterrupted service guarantee. Since the commercial viability of a network in a competitive market depends on the perceived user satisfaction, to atone for the service discontinuity (otherwise known as the outage loss) some form of compensation ought to be provided. Mathematical models arising from the game theory offer viable solutions for deducing a fair distribution of this compensation among different service types (i.e., flat rate based and volume based). In this paper, we propose a non-cooperative game theory based pricing mechanism that compensates the user by reducing the unit service charge across different subscription classes (i.e., economic, silver and gold). A lossy utility function is utilized to derive the highest amount of cost reduction that the network can accommodate. Governed by the Nash equilibrium points, the fair distribution of this cost reduction among different service types (as demonstrated by simulation results) forms the subject matter of this paper.