Re-Imagining Tax Justice in a Globalized World

Tsilly Dagan
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Abstract

In this paper I explain why designing a country’s tax policy with the elasticity of taxpayers’ choices of residency in mind, although a rational welfare-maximizing move by the state as a whole, and possibly even for its immobile as well as mobile constituents, is a policy that may not be justified under a liberal-egalitarian social contract. I discuss two polar views of the social contract: one endorsing the state with the coercive power to promote the joint interests of its constituents. The other, views the coercive power of the state as a way to fulfil the collective will of its constituents as a society of equals in order to promote who they are as people. If states’ coercive power is based on equal respect and concern, a policy that undercuts such equality might not be justified. The state thus faces a dilemma: taking into account the increased electivity of taxation (by some) could undermine the normative foundations of the power of the state to tax. Ignoring such increased electivity, on the other hand, may limit the potential of some individuals and the state as a whole to flourish.
重新构想全球化世界中的税收公正
在本文中,我解释了为什么在设计一个国家的税收政策时,考虑到纳税人选择居住地的弹性,尽管国家作为一个整体,甚至可能对其固定和流动的组成部分来说,是一个合理的福利最大化的举措,但在自由平等主义的社会契约下,这一政策可能是不合理的。我讨论了社会契约的两种极端观点:一种支持国家以强制权力促进其组成部分的共同利益。另一种观点认为,国家的强制权力是一种实现其成员作为平等社会的集体意志的方式,目的是提升他们作为人的身份。如果国家的强制权力是基于平等的尊重和关心,那么削弱这种平等的政策可能是不合理的。因此,国家面临着一个两难境地:考虑到税收选择性的增加(某些人)可能会破坏国家征税权力的规范基础。另一方面,忽视这种增加的选择性,可能会限制一些个人和整个国家繁荣发展的潜力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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