A Collective Agreement is Not Inherently Anti Competitive in Japan: Trade Unions, Self-Employed Workers and the Antimonopoly Act

ERN: Monopoly Pub Date : 2020-10-28 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3783773
Masako Wakui
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Abstract

The recent phenomena that the gig workers, franchisees and sellers using online shopping platform establish ‘unions’ to bargain collectively with their powerful counterparties give rise to questions as to how these organisations should be dealt under the competition laws. Although it is established that Japanese competition law, Antimonopoly Act (AMA), is not applicable to workers and their collective actions, the legal status of the above entities, which I call self-employed workers, is not clear. Possibility is that they are deemed enterprises, rather than workers, and their collective activities are deemed illegal cartels on which severe sanctions are imposed under the AMA. To help discussion, the article analyses conventional trade unions’ effect and nature from competition law perspectives. Such analysis should be informative given self-employed workers organisations’ aims and activities as well as their members’ economically dependent status are largely the same with ones of trade unions. Having clarified that the trade union should not be viewed neither as a monopoly nor as a cartel for the purpose of the AMA and that market share, or union density, is not helpful in assessing unions’ power, I analyse unions’ unique ways of influencing working conditions - collective bargaining and strike and engagement in regulatory, judicial and legislative activities - and contends that their activities are generally unlikely to be anticompetitive in Japan. Meanwhile, the complex nature of such analysis also become clear. I then conclude that the AMA is a brunt tool to evaluate effect and legitimacy of collective actions to counter powerful buyers, be it conventional employees or self-employed workers, and that the legislature, neither the AMA nor the competition authority, should determine whether self-employed workers should be allowed to unionise and engage in collective actions.
集体协议在日本并非天生反竞争:工会、个体经营者与反垄断法
最近,零工工人、特许经营商和使用在线购物平台的卖家建立了“工会”,与强大的交易对手进行集体谈判,这一现象引发了人们对这些组织应如何在竞争法下处理的质疑。虽然日本竞争法《反垄断法》(AMA)已经确定不适用于工人及其集体行为,但上述实体(我称之为个体经营者)的法律地位并不明确。他们的集体活动也有可能被认定为非法卡特尔,并受到严厉制裁。本文从竞争法的角度分析了传统工会的作用和性质。鉴于个体经营者组织的目标和活动以及其成员的经济依赖地位与工会的目标和活动基本相同,这种分析应该是有益的。澄清了工会既不应被视为垄断,也不应被视为卡特尔,市场份额或工会密度对评估工会的权力没有帮助,我分析了工会影响工作条件的独特方式——集体谈判、罢工和参与监管、司法和立法活动——并认为,工会的活动在日本一般不太可能是反竞争的。同时,这种分析的复杂性也变得清晰起来。然后我得出结论,AMA是评估集体行动的效果和合法性的主要工具,以对抗强大的买家,无论是传统雇员还是个体经营者,立法机构,无论是AMA还是竞争管理机构,都应该决定是否允许个体经营者成立工会并参与集体行动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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