Policy Brief 9: Informal networks and what they mean for anti-corruption practice

Claudia Baez Camargo, Jacopo Costa, Saba Kassa
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Abstract

Corruption is frequently associated with money alone and the behaviours of a few individual “bad apples” operating in otherwise healthy governance systems. This is too simplistic. As the latest research shows, including research in Tanzania and Uganda on which this Policy Brief is based, corruption is a networked phenomenon. This Policy Brief explains what this means and its implications for anti-corruption practice. When ordinary citizens and business people face problems, like constrained access to public services or an uneven playing field, they invest time, effort and resources in building informal networks. Held together by personal connections and corrupt payments, these informal networks are a problem-solving mechanism. They allow members – such as business people, other citizens and public officials – to pursue a variety of goals. The networks aid in easing access to public services, for example, or helping a business to run smoothly, or securing business opportunities with the government. Informal networks can be leveraged to speed up long and complicated permit processes or exploit weaknesses in formal tender processes to obtain undue access to contracts. When red tape is used by public officials to extort bribes from service users, informal networks can help manage and overcome these demands.  In contexts in which these informal networks are widespread, the research shows that conventional anti-corruption measures, such as introducing more regulations, policies and controls, can actually backfire and increase corruption.  Breaking this self-reinforcing cycle of networked corruption requires a shift in thinking and approaches: Focusing on networked corruption as opposed to individual corrupt behaviours. Tackling corruption both from the demand and the supply side by addressing inefficiencies and weaknesses in public systems that cause problems for ordinary citizens and business people. This may make it less likely that they will resort to corruption through informal networks to overcome the public service weaknesses. Harnessing informal networks for anti-corruption objectives. This includes leveraging new insights into social norms and networks and establishing Collective Action initiatives to better target the underlying drivers of corruption. This Policy Brief presents findings from a research project entitled “Harnessing informality: Designing anti-corruption network interventions and strategic use of legal instruments”, funded by UK Aid as part of the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (GI-ACE).
政策简报9:非正式网络及其对反腐败实践的意义
腐败往往只与金钱有关,也与少数在健康治理体系中运作的个别“害群之马”的行为有关。这太简单化了。最新的研究表明,包括本政策简报所依据的坦桑尼亚和乌干达的研究,腐败是一种网络现象。本政策摘要解释了这意味着什么,以及它对反腐败实践的影响。当普通公民和商界人士面临诸如获得公共服务受限或竞争环境不公平等问题时,他们会投入时间、精力和资源来建立非正式网络。这些非正式网络通过个人关系和腐败的支付维系在一起,是一种解决问题的机制。他们允许成员——如商人、其他公民和政府官员——追求各种目标。例如,这些网络有助于方便地获得公共服务,或帮助企业顺利运营,或确保与政府的商业机会。可以利用非正式网络加快漫长而复杂的许可程序,或利用正式招标程序中的弱点,不适当地获得合同。当政府官员利用繁文缛节向服务用户勒索贿赂时,非正式网络可以帮助管理和克服这些要求。在这些非正式网络广泛存在的背景下,研究表明,传统的反腐败措施,如引入更多的法规、政策和控制,实际上可能适得其反,加剧腐败。打破这种网络腐败的自我强化循环需要转变思维和方法:关注网络腐败,而不是个人腐败行为。通过解决公共系统的效率低下和弱点,从需求和供给两方面解决腐败问题,这些问题给普通公民和商界人士带来了问题。这可能使他们不太可能通过非正式网络诉诸腐败来克服公共服务的弱点。利用非正式网络实现反腐败目标。这包括利用对社会规范和网络的新见解,并制定集体行动倡议,以更好地针对腐败的根本驱动因素。本政策简报介绍了一项名为“利用非正式:设计反腐败网络干预措施和战略性使用法律工具”的研究项目的结果,该项目由英国援助署资助,是全球廉政反腐败证据计划(GI-ACE)的一部分。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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