Overconfidence and risk behavior in family firms

Beatrice Orlando, Antonio Renzi, Giuseppe Sancetta, G. Vagnani
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This study proposes an original theoretical contribution on the risk behavior of family firms. Traditionally, individual decision making is deemed to have a strong influence on the risk behavior of an organization, in the sense that firm’s choices are biased by individual characteristics. In non-family firms, the responsibility for the risk behavior of the company only depends on managers. By contrast, in family businesses there is an interplay between biases of those family members actually controlling the company and top managers choices. Whilst the agency theory offers an effective explanation of the relationship between the agent and the principal, the family business stream of research still lacks of such a theory, able to explain the impact of the principal behavior on the organization’s risk propensity. Our study aims to tackle this huge and relevant gap. We study how the risk propensity of family firms is influenced by those family members who are in direct control of the company (e.g. by participating of the board of directors). We focus on a specific behavioral characteristic, which is overconfidence. Overconfidence roughly occurs as the overestimation of the precision of the individual knowledge, both in the negative and the positive domain. As the consequence, the future is seen as either fulfilled with hopes or “Corporate Governance: Search for the Advanced Practices” Rome, February 28, 2019 29 the opposite, alternatively. After extensively analyzing the literature on the topic, we propose a conceptual model for the interplay between overconfidence and risk behavior in family firms. We hypothesize that belief of those family members who exert control over the firms are a relevant predictor of the risk behavior of the company. In particular, we focus on how the overconfidence of family members predicts the risk propensity in family firms. Our theoretical contribution brings substantial knowledge advancement in studies on family firms by filling a resonating gap, which demands future empirical testing.
家族企业的过度自信与风险行为
本研究对家族企业的风险行为提出了独到的理论贡献。传统上,个人决策被认为对组织的风险行为有很强的影响,因为企业的选择受到个人特征的影响。在非家族企业中,企业风险行为的责任只取决于管理者。相比之下,在家族企业中,实际控制公司的家族成员的偏见与高层管理人员的选择之间存在相互作用。代理理论对代理人与委托人之间的关系提供了有效的解释,但家族企业研究仍然缺乏这样一个理论,能够解释委托人行为对组织风险倾向的影响。我们的研究旨在解决这一巨大而相关的差距。我们研究了家族企业的风险倾向如何受到那些直接控制公司的家族成员(例如通过参与董事会)的影响。我们关注的是一种特定的行为特征,即过度自信。过度自信大致表现为对个人知识精度的过高估计,无论是在消极领域还是在积极领域。因此,未来要么被视为充满希望,要么被视为“公司治理:寻找先进实践”,或者相反。在对相关文献进行广泛分析后,我们提出了家族企业过度自信与风险行为相互作用的概念模型。我们假设控制企业的家族成员的信念是企业风险行为的相关预测因子。我们特别关注家族成员的过度自信如何预测家族企业的风险倾向。我们的理论贡献填补了一个共振的空白,为家族企业研究带来了实质性的知识进步,这需要未来的实证检验。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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