Rethinking Dual-Class Share Structure in the Context of China

Fei Gao
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Abstract

The dual-class share structure enables founders to maintain control of the company while obtaining external financing. It is popular with innovative companies. However, it deviates from the default rule of “one share, one vote” and has hence elicited heated debates on the topic.

This article aims to contribute to the debate on dual-class share structure in the context of China. Chinese Company Law insists on the “one share, one vote” principle, and joint stock companies are not allowed to issue weighted voting shares. This article suggests that it is necessary to allow dual-class share structure in China for two reasons. First, the immense pressure of exchange competition from other jurisdictions, and second, to meet the demands of innovative companies and heterogeneous shareholders.

The China Securities Regulations Committee (CSRC) recently launched the Science and Technology Innovation Board on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, issuing a new listing rule, which allows listed company to adopt dual-class share structure. However, some defects were found on the rules of dual-class share structure and needs to be improved. First, we should modify the Company Law and allow listed company to issue weighted voting shares. Second, shareholders ought to be encouraged to lay limitations on dual-class share structure in the articles of association, rather than through mandatory legal provisions. Third, information disclosure requirements imposed on the founder ought to be enhanced to prevent the founder from procuring private benefits. Fourth, the Investor Service Center (ISC) should be allowed to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the investors as long as the number of investors who have authorized it to do so hits a certain quota, and the cases supported by the ISC should become guiding cases which has de facto binding effect for similar subsequent cases. Last of all, the application of dual-class share structure should be made available to all listed companies after this area of company law has matured after years of practice.
中国背景下的股权双层结构再思考
双重股权结构使创始人在获得外部融资的同时保持对公司的控制权。它在创新型公司中很受欢迎。然而,它偏离了“一股一票”的默认规则,因此引发了激烈的争论。本文旨在为中国背景下的股权双层结构之争做出贡献。中国公司法坚持“一股一票”原则,股份制公司不允许发行有投票权的股份。本文认为,在中国允许双重股权结构是必要的,原因有二。首先,来自其他司法管辖区的巨大交易所竞争压力;其次,满足创新型公司和异质股东的需求。中国证券监督管理委员会(证监会)近日在上海证券交易所成立了科技创新板,并发布了一项新的上市规则,允许上市公司采用双层股权结构。但是,我国股权双层结构的规则存在一些缺陷,需要进一步完善。首先,我们应该修改公司法,允许上市公司发行有投票权的股份。其次,应鼓励股东在公司章程中限制双层股权结构,而不是通过强制性法律规定。第三,应加强对创始人的信息披露要求,防止创始人获取私人利益。第四,只要获得授权的投资者数量达到一定限额,投资者服务中心就可以代表投资者提起诉讼,其支持的案件应成为指导性案例,对后续类似案件具有事实上的约束力。最后,在公司法领域经过多年的实践趋于成熟后,双层股权结构的适用应该适用于所有上市公司。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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