Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis

Armenak Antinyan, Zareh Asatryan
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引用次数: 54

Abstract

Tax compliance nudges are used increasingly by governments because of their perceived cost-effectiveness in raising tax revenue. We collect about a thousand treatment effect estimates from 45 randomized controlled trials, and synthesize this rapidly growing literature using meta-analytical methods. We show that interventions pointing to elements of individual tax morale are on average ineffective in curbing tax evasion (when evaluated against a control group of taxpayers receiving neutral communication). In contrast, deterrence nudges - interventions emphasizing traditional determinants of compliance such as audit probabilities and penalty rates - increase compliance. However, their effects are modest in magnitude increasing the probability of compliance by 1.5-2.5 percentage points more than non-deterrence nudges. Our additional results suggest that nudges i) work better on sub-samples of late payers and when delivered in-person, ii) are less effective in the long-run and in lower-income countries, and iii) are somewhat inflated by selective reporting of results.
推动税收合规:一项元分析
政府越来越多地使用税收合规推动措施,因为他们认为这在增加税收方面具有成本效益。我们从45个随机对照试验中收集了大约1000个治疗效果估计,并使用元分析方法综合了这些快速增长的文献。我们表明,针对个人税收士气因素的干预措施在遏制逃税方面平均无效(当与接受中立沟通的纳税人对照组进行评估时)。相比之下,威慑推动——强调合规的传统决定因素(如审计概率和处罚率)的干预措施——提高了合规。然而,他们的影响是适度的,比非威慑性的推动增加了1.5-2.5个百分点的遵守概率。我们的其他研究结果表明,推动i)在延迟付款人的子样本中效果更好,并且在亲自交付时效果更好,ii)长期和低收入国家的效果较差,iii)选择性报告结果在一定程度上夸大了效果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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