Banking Union’s Accountability System in Practice. A Health Check-Up to Europe’s Financial Heart

Marco Lamandini, David Ramos Muñoz
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Abstract

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are a recent, and remarkable, piece of institutional architecture that form the core of the Banking Union, which comprise national competent supervisory authorities (NCAs) and national resolution authorities (NRAs) combined with the role of an EU institution, the European Central Bank (ECB) and an EU agency, the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The vast array of powers by the two entities, the complexity of coordination, and the fact that decision-making over some of the more sensitive issues in financial policy has been allocated to the EU make accountability a key requisite for the system’s success. Some of the provisions applicable provide a solid foundation for a system of strong accountability. We find however that there may be room for some improvements to effectively counterbalance the powers given to the SSM and the SRB and to increase their accountability at the European level without undermining their independence and within the boundaries of the current legal framework.
银行业联盟问责制的实践。对欧洲金融中心进行健康检查
单一监管机制(SSM)和单一决议机制(SRM)是最近出现的、引人注目的制度架构,构成了银行业联盟的核心,它包括国家主管监管机构(NCAs)和国家决议机构(NRAs),并结合了欧盟机构欧洲央行(ECB)和欧盟机构单一决议委员会(SRB)的作用。这两个实体拥有的巨大权力、协调的复杂性,以及在一些较为敏感的金融政策问题上的决策权已被分配给欧盟的事实,使得问责制成为该体系成功的关键条件。一些适用的规定为强有力的问责制提供了坚实的基础。然而,我们发现可能有一些改进的空间,以有效地平衡赋予SSM和SRB的权力,并在不损害其独立性和在当前法律框架范围内增加其在欧洲一级的问责制。
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