People v. Sarun Chun - In Its Latest Battle with Merger Doctrine, Has the California Supreme Court Effectively Merged Second-Degree Felony Murder out of Existence
{"title":"People v. Sarun Chun - In Its Latest Battle with Merger Doctrine, Has the California Supreme Court Effectively Merged Second-Degree Felony Murder out of Existence","authors":"David Mishook","doi":"10.15779/Z38HP68","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In July of 2009, in the latest salvo in its long struggle to limit California's second-degree felony-murder doctrine, the California Supreme Court announced its decision in People v. Sarun Chun.1 The decision's two holdings at once undercut the doctrine's use in criminal prosecutions and entrench second-degree felony murder in California law. First, after more than forty years of dicta to the contrary, the Court held that second-degree felony-murder doctrine was statutory and not, as was previously understood, judicially created. At the same time, the Court limited the scope of felony murder by interpreting anew its \"merger doctrine\"-the Court-made exception to felony murder in which certain underlying felonies \"merge\" with a resulting homicide, 2 precluding a felony-murder charge. Chun, the latest of many changes to merger doctrine since it was first announced in 1969 in People v. Ireland, dramatically reinterprets the way merger functions in second-degree felony-murder prosecutions. Under the new Chun standard, all felonies that contain an \"assaultive\" element merge per se with the resulting homicide and may no longer serve as the basis of a felonymurder charge. Much like the related \"inherently dangerous felony\" limitation for felony murder, the Court's new test is intended to create predictability for the practitioner, since judicial determinations of merger will now be based on the face of the statute, and no longer on the particular facts of a defendant's","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"42 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38HP68","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
In July of 2009, in the latest salvo in its long struggle to limit California's second-degree felony-murder doctrine, the California Supreme Court announced its decision in People v. Sarun Chun.1 The decision's two holdings at once undercut the doctrine's use in criminal prosecutions and entrench second-degree felony murder in California law. First, after more than forty years of dicta to the contrary, the Court held that second-degree felony-murder doctrine was statutory and not, as was previously understood, judicially created. At the same time, the Court limited the scope of felony murder by interpreting anew its "merger doctrine"-the Court-made exception to felony murder in which certain underlying felonies "merge" with a resulting homicide, 2 precluding a felony-murder charge. Chun, the latest of many changes to merger doctrine since it was first announced in 1969 in People v. Ireland, dramatically reinterprets the way merger functions in second-degree felony-murder prosecutions. Under the new Chun standard, all felonies that contain an "assaultive" element merge per se with the resulting homicide and may no longer serve as the basis of a felonymurder charge. Much like the related "inherently dangerous felony" limitation for felony murder, the Court's new test is intended to create predictability for the practitioner, since judicial determinations of merger will now be based on the face of the statute, and no longer on the particular facts of a defendant's
2009年7月,在限制加州二级重罪谋杀原则的长期斗争中,加州最高法院宣布了其在“人民诉萨伦春案”(People v. Sarun chun)一案中的裁决。该裁决的两项主张同时削弱了该原则在刑事诉讼中的应用,并使二级重罪谋杀在加州法律中得到巩固。首先,经过四十多年的相反意见,法院认为二级重罪谋杀原则是法定的,而不是像以前所理解的那样,是司法创造的。与此同时,最高法院通过重新解释其“合并原则”,限制了重罪谋杀的范围——法院对某些潜在的重罪与由此产生的杀人罪“合并”的重罪谋杀作出例外规定,2排除了重罪谋杀指控。自1969年在人民诉爱尔兰案中首次宣布合并原则以来,Chun是合并原则的最新变化,戏剧性地重新解释了合并在二级重罪谋杀起诉中的作用方式。在新的Chun标准下,所有包含“攻击”元素的重罪本身与由此产生的杀人罪合并,并且可能不再作为重罪谋杀罪的基础。与重罪谋杀的相关“固有危险重罪”限制非常相似,法院的新测试旨在为从业者创造可预测性,因为对合并的司法决定现在将基于法规的外观,而不再基于被告的特定事实