SEC Revanchism and the Expansion of Primary Liability Under Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5

Andrew N. Vollmer
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Abstract

An important issue in many enforcement cases brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission is the scope of primary liability under the two main anti-fraud provisions, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. In Flannery, which was an administrative enforcement case, a bare majority of SEC Commissioners adopted broad positions on primary liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) and Section 17(a)(1), (2), and (3). The Commission not only advanced expansive legal conclusions, but it also insisted that the courts accept the agency’s legal interpretations as controlling.This article discusses two issues that Flannery raises, both of them related to the role of administrative agencies in the development, enforcement, and adjudication of federal law. First, the article compares the Commission’s interpretations of the parts of Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 with the reasoning and analysis of a series of prominent Supreme Court decisions that imposed meaningful boundaries around aspects of primary liability under Rule 10b-5. That comparison shows that much about Flannery is not consistent with, and is antagonistic to, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Central Bank, Stoneridge, and Janus.Second, the article evaluates Flannery’s explicit demand for Chevron deference and concludes that a reviewing court would have doctrinal and precedential grounds for refusing to accept the Flannery positions as controlling. The reasons start with the text of the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act governing judicial review of agency actions and also cover the actual practice of the Supreme Court and courts of appeals when they review a legal conclusion in an agency adjudication. The precedents identify good reasons for not granting Chevron deference to Flannery. Giving controlling effect to the SEC’s decision would allow the agency both to avoid the teachings of leading Supreme Court authorities and to trump the Supreme Court and other federal courts on significant matters of statutory interpretation.
第17(a)条和规则10b-5条规定的SEC复仇主义和主要责任的扩大
在美国证券交易委员会提起的许多执法案件中,一个重要问题是两个主要反欺诈条款(《证券法》第17(a)条和《交易法》第10b-5条)下的主要责任范围。在Flannery案中,这是一个行政执法案件,绝大多数SEC委员根据规则10b-5(a)和(c)以及第17(a)(1),(2)和(3)对主要责任采取了广泛的立场。委员会不仅提出了广泛的法律结论,而且还坚持法院接受该机构的法律解释作为控制。本文讨论了弗兰纳里提出的两个问题,这两个问题都与行政机构在联邦法律的制定、执行和裁决中的作用有关。首先,本文比较了委员会对第17(a)条和规则10b-5部分的解释与对一系列著名的最高法院判决的推理和分析,这些判决围绕规则10b-5规定的主要责任方面施加了有意义的界限。这种比较表明,弗兰纳里案在很大程度上与最高法院对中央银行案、斯通里奇案和Janus案的判决不一致,甚至是对立的。其次,本文评估了弗兰纳里对雪佛龙服从的明确要求,并得出结论,复审法院将有理论和先例依据拒绝接受弗兰纳里的控股权立场。其原因始于《行政程序法》中关于机关行为司法审查的规定,也包括最高法院和上诉法院在审查机关裁决中的法律结论时的实际做法。先例确定了不允许雪佛龙服从弗兰纳里的充分理由。使SEC的决定具有控制效力,将使该机构既可以避免最高法院权威机构的教导,又可以在重大的法律解释问题上胜过最高法院和其他联邦法院。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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