Pricing Treatments Cost-Effectively when They Have Multiple Indications: Not Just a Simple Threshold Analysis.

IF 3.1 3区 医学 Q2 HEALTH CARE SCIENCES & SERVICES
Medical Decision Making Pub Date : 2023-10-01 Epub Date: 2023-09-12 DOI:10.1177/0272989X231197772
Jeremy D Goldhaber-Fiebert, Lauren E Cipriano
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Background: Economic evaluations of treatments increasingly employ price-threshold analyses. When a treatment has multiple indications, standard price-threshold analyses can be overly simplistic. We examine how rules governing indication-specific prices and reimbursement decisions affect value-based price analyses.

Methods: We analyze a 2-stage game between 2 players: the therapy's manufacturer and the payer purchasing it for patients. First, the manufacturer selects a price(s) that may be indication specific. Then, the payer decides whether to provide reimbursement at the offered price(s). We assume known indication-specific demand. The manufacturer seeks to maximize profit. The payer seeks to maximize total population incremental net monetary benefit and will not pay more than their willingness-to-pay threshold. We consider game variants defined by constraints on the manufacturer's ability to price and payer's ability to provide reimbursement differentially by indication.

Results: When both the manufacturer and payer can make indication-specific decisions, the problem simplifies to multiple single-indication price-threshold analyses, and the manufacturer captures all the consumer surplus. When the manufacturer is restricted to one price and the payer must make an all-or-nothing reimbursement decision, the selected price is a weighted average of indication-specific threshold prices such that reimbursement of more valuable indications subsidizes reimbursement of less valuable indications. With a single price and indication-specific coverage decisions, the manufacturer may select a high price where fewer patients receive treatment because the payer restricts reimbursement to the set of indications providing value commensurate with the high price. However, the manufacturer may select a low price, resulting in reimbursement for more indications and positive consumer surplus.

Conclusions: When treatments have multiple indications, economic evaluations including price-threshold analyses should carefully consider jurisdiction-specific rules regarding pricing and reimbursement decisions.

Highlights: With treatment prices rising, economic evaluations increasingly employ price-threshold analyses to identify value-based prices. Standard price-threshold analyses can be overly simplistic when treatments have multiple indications.Jurisdiction-specific rules governing indication-specific prices and reimbursement decisions affect value-based price analyses.When the manufacturer is restricted to one price for all indications and the payer must make an all-or-nothing reimbursement decision, the selected price is a weighted average of indication-specific threshold prices such that reimbursement of the more valuable indications subsidize reimbursement of the less valuable indications.With a single price and indication-specific coverage decisions, the manufacturer may select a high price with fewer patients treated than in the first-best solution. There are also cases in which the manufacturer selects a lower price, resulting in reimbursement for more indications and positive consumer surplus.

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当治疗有多种适应症时,为其定价具有成本效益:不仅仅是简单的阈值分析。
背景:治疗的经济评估越来越多地采用价格阈值分析。当一种治疗有多种适应症时,标准价格阈值分析可能过于简单化。我们研究了特定指示价格和报销决策的规则如何影响基于价值的价格分析。方法:我们分析了两个参与者之间的两阶段博弈:治疗的制造商和为患者购买治疗的付款人。首先,制造商选择可能是特定指示的价格。然后,付款人决定是否以所提供的价格提供补偿。我们假设已知指示特定需求。制造商寻求利润最大化。付款人寻求最大限度地增加总人口的净货币利益,并且不会支付超过其支付意愿阈值的费用。我们考虑了由制造商定价能力和付款人通过指示差异提供补偿能力的约束定义的游戏变体。结果:当制造商和付款人都能做出特定指示的决策时,问题简化为多个单一指示价格阈值分析,制造商捕获了所有消费者剩余。当制造商被限制为一个价格,并且付款人必须做出要么全有要么全无的补偿决定时,所选择的价格是指示特定阈值价格的加权平均值,使得更有价值指示的补偿补贴了价值较低指示的补偿。对于单一价格和适应症特定的覆盖范围决策,制造商可以选择高价格,其中较少的患者接受治疗,因为付款人将报销限制在提供与高价格相称的价值的适应症集合。然而,制造商可能会选择较低的价格,从而为更多的适应症和正的消费者盈余提供补偿。结论:当治疗有多种适应症时,包括价格阈值分析在内的经济评估应仔细考虑有关定价和报销决策的司法管辖区特定规则。亮点:随着治疗价格的上涨,经济评估越来越多地采用价格阈值分析来确定基于价值的价格。当治疗有多种适应症时,标准价格阈值分析可能过于简单。管辖特定指示价格和报销决定的特定管辖区规则影响基于价值的价格分析。当制造商被限制为所有适应症的一个价格,并且付款人必须做出全有或全无补偿的决定时,所选择的价格是适应症特定阈值价格的加权平均值,使得更有价值适应症的补偿补贴价值较低适应症的补偿。通过单一的价格和适应症特定的覆盖范围决定,制造商可以选择一个高价格,与第一个最佳解决方案相比,接受治疗的患者更少。还有一些情况是,制造商选择了更低的价格,从而为更多的适应症和正的消费者盈余提供补偿。
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来源期刊
Medical Decision Making
Medical Decision Making 医学-卫生保健
CiteScore
6.50
自引率
5.60%
发文量
146
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Medical Decision Making offers rigorous and systematic approaches to decision making that are designed to improve the health and clinical care of individuals and to assist with health care policy development. Using the fundamentals of decision analysis and theory, economic evaluation, and evidence based quality assessment, Medical Decision Making presents both theoretical and practical statistical and modeling techniques and methods from a variety of disciplines.
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