Giorgio Calcagnini, Slađana Pavlinović Mršić, Laura Policardo, Edgar J Sanchez Carrera
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引用次数: 1
Abstract
In this paper, we model an evolutionary noncooperative game between politicians and citizens that, given the level of infection, describes the observed variety of mitigation policies and citizens' compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic period. Our results show that different stable equilibria exist and that different ways/paths exist to reach these equilibria may be present, depending on the choice of parameters. When the parameters are chosen opportunistically, in the short run, our model generates transitions between hard and soft policy measures to deal with the pandemic. In the long-run, convergence is achieved toward one of the possible stable steady states (obey or not obey lockdown rules) as functions of politicians' and citizens' incentives.
期刊介绍：
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination addresses the vibrant and interdisciplinary field of agent-based approaches to economics and social sciences.
It focuses on simulating and synthesizing emergent phenomena and collective behavior in order to understand economic and social systems. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to, the following: markets as complex adaptive systems, multi-agents in economics, artificial markets with heterogeneous agents, financial markets with heterogeneous agents, theory and simulation of agent-based models, adaptive agents with artificial intelligence, interacting particle systems in economics, social and complex networks, econophysics, non-linear economic dynamics, evolutionary games, market mechanisms in distributed computing systems, experimental economics, collective decisions.
Contributions are mostly from economics, physics, computer science and related fields and are typically based on sound theoretical models and supported by experimental validation. Survey papers are also welcome.
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination is the official journal of the Association of Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents.
Officially cited as: J Econ Interact Coord
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