Agency conflicts, financial constraints, and dynamic q-theory

已完结 10 由立秋发布于 2024/11/14 9:43:19

DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111501
作者：Siqi Zhao ,?Bangru Shi
文献类型：期刊论文
补充材料：只需要正文

Elsevier

Abstract：We develop a dynamic q-theoretic model where equity financing is uncertain and investment is delegated to a self-interested manager. We find that agency conflicts generate more volatile inve

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