议会中的威慑和强制

D. Altindag, N. Mocan, Jie Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在大多数国家,议会豁免权保护立法者在任职期间免受民事或刑事指控,并使他们免受因政治言论和行为而受到起诉。我们提出了议会豁免权对政治家行为和表现影响的第一个实证分析。利用土耳其宪法修正案解除24%国会议员的豁免权,我们发现,失去起诉豁免权安抚了反对派议员,他们变得不那么勤奋(起草和发起的立法或调查更少,发表的演讲更少、更短),也不那么咄咄逼人(打断其他议员的频率更低)。他们投反对票反对政府的倾向也减少了。这些议员不太可能在下次选举中被他们的政党重新提名,也不太可能再次当选。失去豁免权对与政府结盟的议员没有影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Deterrence and Compellence in Parliament
In most countries, parliamentary immunity protects lawmakers from civil or criminal charges while in office, and it shields them from prosecution for their political speech and actions. We present the first empirical analysis of the impact of parliamentary immunity on the behavior and performance of politicians. Leveraging a constitutional amendment that lifted the immunity of 24 percent of the members of the Turkish Parliament (MPs), we find that losing immunity from prosecution pacifies opposition MPs, who become less diligent (drafting and initiating fewer pieces of legislation or inquiries, delivering fewer and shorter speeches) and less aggressive (interrupting other MPs less frequently). Their tendency to cast dissenting votes against the government is also reduced. These MPs are less likely to be renominated by their parties for the next election, and they are less likely to be reelected. The loss of immunity has no impact on government-aligned MPs.
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