微分n人博弈:纳什均衡和马瑟测度

IF 1.6 4区计算机科学 Q3 AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS

IMA Journal of Mathematical Control and Information Pub Date : 2023-02-21 DOI:10.1093/imamci/dnad006

Cristian Mendico

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引用次数: 1

摘要

研究了确定性遍历n人博弈的纳什均衡。我们将介绍纯策略，混合策略以及与之相关的纳什均衡。我们证明了混合策略中存在纳什均衡，它是由代价泛函定义的拉格朗日系统的马瑟测度。最后，我们证明了n人博弈的平均场极限可以用参与者连续体的遍历偏微分方程系统来描述。

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Differential N-players game: Nash equilibria and Mather measures

We study Nash equilibria for the deterministic ergodic N-players game. We introduce pure strategies, mixed strategies and Nash equilibria associated with those. We show that a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies exists and it is a Mather measure for the Lagrangian system defined by the cost functional. In conclusion, we show that the mean field limit of the N-players game is described by the ergodic partial differential equation’s system for a continuum of players.

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来源期刊

IMA Journal of Mathematical Control and Information 工程技术-应用数学

CiteScore

3.30

自引率

6.70%

发文量

审稿时长

>12 weeks

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