管理能力和债务期限

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Joye Khoo , Adrian (Wai Kong) Cheung
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引用次数: 10

摘要

我们考察了管理能力是否以及如何影响公司债务到期决策。在由高能力经理经营的公司中,对短期债务的需求预计会更高,这些经理拥有预测公司经济前景和沟通其私人信息所需的卓越技能,从而缓解信息不对称并提高其声誉。我们发现,拥有高能力管理人员的公司与更多的短期债务融资有关。对于面临严重信息不对称问题的企业、无约束企业或高质量企业,这种效应更强。从对短期和长期债务发行活动的分析中发现了支持性证据。我们的研究结果对于管理能力和债务期限选择的替代措施仍然稳健,并且不受省略变量偏差,内生性问题或行业集团的驱动。总的来说,我们提供了强有力的证据支持债务期限结构的信号理论,并有助于对管理能力的研究。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Managerial ability and debt maturity

We examine whether and how managerial ability affects corporate debt maturity decisions. The demand for shorter maturity debt is expected to be higher in firms operated by high-ability managers, who possess the superior skills needed to anticipate firms’ economic prospects and communicate their private information, thereby alleviating information asymmetry and bolstering their reputation. We document that firms with high ability managers are associated with more short-term debt financing. The effect becomes stronger for firms facing severe information asymmetry problems, unconstrained firms or high quality firms. Supportive evidence is found from the analysis of short- and long-term debt issuance activity. Our findings remain robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and debt maturity choice, and are not driven by omitted variable bias, endogeneity concerns or industry group. Overall, we provide robust evidence that supports the signalling theory for debt maturity structure and contributes to the literatures on managerial ability.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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