持续的冲突和僵局:注释

IF 0.6 Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Economics Bulletin Pub Date : 2007-03-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.975023

Raul Caruso

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引用次数: 23

摘要

这篇文章是关于持续冲突中出现僵局的可能性。根据关于这一主题的主流经济学文献，在某些假设下，冲突的结果可以用两种方式描述:(i)有争议的产出的预先分配;(ii)赢者通吃的竞赛，获胜的代理人有能力攫取所有有争议的赌注。相比之下，在现实中，许多争端没有明确或明确的结果。僵局可以以平局的结果结束冲突。为了允许僵局，需要对经典的Hirshleifer冲突模型进行一些正式的修改。特别是，僵局的可能性可以通过布拉瓦茨基(Blavatskyy, 2004)提出的一种修改形式的竞赛成功函数(Contest Success Function)来捕捉。在可能出现僵局的情况下，这种情景比Hirshleifer的经典模型显示出更高水平的“枪”。同时，它也表现出较低的熵度。

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Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A Note

This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality many disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcome. A stalemate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalemate, some formal modifications to the classical Hirshleifer’s model of conflict are needed. In particular, the possibility of a stalemate can be captured through a modified form of the Contest Success Function as axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2004). Under the possibility of a stalemate, the scenario exhibits a higher level of ‘guns’ than Hirshleifer’s classical model. At the same time, it also exhibits a lower degree of entropy.

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来源期刊

Economics Bulletin ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Economic Bulletin is an open-access letters journal founded in 2001 with the mission of providing free and extremely rapid scientific communication across the entire community of research economists. EB publishes original notes, comments, and preliminary results. We are especially interested in publishingmanuscripts that keep the profession informed about on-going research programs. Our publication standard is that a manuscript be original, correct and of interest to a specialist. Submissions in these categories are refereed and our objective is to make a decision within two months. Accepted papers are published immediately. It is expected that in many cases, manuscripts published in these categories will form the foundation for more complete works to besubsequently submitted to other journals. In all cases, submissions are restricted to seven printed pages exclusive of references, tables, figures, and appendices, and must be in PDF format. EB also publishes non-refereed letters to the editor, conference announcements and research announcements.