Jean Dubreuil, Guillaume Bouffard, Bhagyalekshmy N. Thampi, Jean-Louis Lanet
{"title":"减轻Java卡上的类型混淆","authors":"Jean Dubreuil, Guillaume Bouffard, Bhagyalekshmy N. Thampi, Jean-Louis Lanet","doi":"10.4018/jsse.2013040102","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One of the challenges for smart card deployment is the security interoperability. A smart card resistant to an attack on a given platform should be able to guarantee the same behavior on another platform. But the current implementations do not comply with this requirement. In order to improve such standardization we propose a framework based on annotations with an external pre-processing to switch the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) into a secure mode by activating a set of countermeasures. An example has been proposed in this paper for implementing a countermeasure against type confusion with a fault attack. Smart cards are often the target of software, hardware or combined attacks. In recent days most of the attacks are based on fault injection which can modify the behavior of applications loaded onto the card, changing them into mutant applications. This countermeasure requires a transformation of the original program byte codes which remain semantically equivalent. It needs a modification of the JCVM which stays backward compatible and a dedicated framework to deploy these applications. Thus, the proposed platform can resist to a fault enabled mutant.","PeriodicalId":89158,"journal":{"name":"International journal of secure software engineering","volume":"47 1","pages":"19-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mitigating Type Confusion on Java Card\",\"authors\":\"Jean Dubreuil, Guillaume Bouffard, Bhagyalekshmy N. Thampi, Jean-Louis Lanet\",\"doi\":\"10.4018/jsse.2013040102\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"One of the challenges for smart card deployment is the security interoperability. A smart card resistant to an attack on a given platform should be able to guarantee the same behavior on another platform. But the current implementations do not comply with this requirement. In order to improve such standardization we propose a framework based on annotations with an external pre-processing to switch the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) into a secure mode by activating a set of countermeasures. An example has been proposed in this paper for implementing a countermeasure against type confusion with a fault attack. Smart cards are often the target of software, hardware or combined attacks. In recent days most of the attacks are based on fault injection which can modify the behavior of applications loaded onto the card, changing them into mutant applications. This countermeasure requires a transformation of the original program byte codes which remain semantically equivalent. It needs a modification of the JCVM which stays backward compatible and a dedicated framework to deploy these applications. Thus, the proposed platform can resist to a fault enabled mutant.\",\"PeriodicalId\":89158,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International journal of secure software engineering\",\"volume\":\"47 1\",\"pages\":\"19-39\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International journal of secure software engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4018/jsse.2013040102\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International journal of secure software engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4018/jsse.2013040102","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the challenges for smart card deployment is the security interoperability. A smart card resistant to an attack on a given platform should be able to guarantee the same behavior on another platform. But the current implementations do not comply with this requirement. In order to improve such standardization we propose a framework based on annotations with an external pre-processing to switch the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) into a secure mode by activating a set of countermeasures. An example has been proposed in this paper for implementing a countermeasure against type confusion with a fault attack. Smart cards are often the target of software, hardware or combined attacks. In recent days most of the attacks are based on fault injection which can modify the behavior of applications loaded onto the card, changing them into mutant applications. This countermeasure requires a transformation of the original program byte codes which remain semantically equivalent. It needs a modification of the JCVM which stays backward compatible and a dedicated framework to deploy these applications. Thus, the proposed platform can resist to a fault enabled mutant.