{"title":"二手商品和可回收材料贸易、非法贸易监测和合法贸易进口配额","authors":"K. Higashida","doi":"10.5652/internationaleconomy/ie2020.23.07.kh","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper theoretically examines the monitoring of illegal trade, and restrictions on the legal trade, of secondhand goods and recyclable materials. We demonstrate that (a) a stricter monitoring necessarily decreases the environmental damage of the importing country as far as there are no legal imports of recyclable materials, and (b) a stricter trade restriction on legal imports increases the environmental damage of the importing country if a part of legal imports is recyclable materials and the marginal environmental damage caused by illegal trade is serious. Moreover, we investigate the policy game on the choice of monitoring probabilities between trading countries. JEL Classification: F13, F18, Q53","PeriodicalId":22492,"journal":{"name":"The International economy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Trade in Secondhand Goods and Recyclable Materials, Monitoring of Illegal Trade, and Import Quotas on Legal Trade\",\"authors\":\"K. Higashida\",\"doi\":\"10.5652/internationaleconomy/ie2020.23.07.kh\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper theoretically examines the monitoring of illegal trade, and restrictions on the legal trade, of secondhand goods and recyclable materials. We demonstrate that (a) a stricter monitoring necessarily decreases the environmental damage of the importing country as far as there are no legal imports of recyclable materials, and (b) a stricter trade restriction on legal imports increases the environmental damage of the importing country if a part of legal imports is recyclable materials and the marginal environmental damage caused by illegal trade is serious. Moreover, we investigate the policy game on the choice of monitoring probabilities between trading countries. JEL Classification: F13, F18, Q53\",\"PeriodicalId\":22492,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The International economy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The International economy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5652/internationaleconomy/ie2020.23.07.kh\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The International economy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5652/internationaleconomy/ie2020.23.07.kh","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Trade in Secondhand Goods and Recyclable Materials, Monitoring of Illegal Trade, and Import Quotas on Legal Trade
This paper theoretically examines the monitoring of illegal trade, and restrictions on the legal trade, of secondhand goods and recyclable materials. We demonstrate that (a) a stricter monitoring necessarily decreases the environmental damage of the importing country as far as there are no legal imports of recyclable materials, and (b) a stricter trade restriction on legal imports increases the environmental damage of the importing country if a part of legal imports is recyclable materials and the marginal environmental damage caused by illegal trade is serious. Moreover, we investigate the policy game on the choice of monitoring probabilities between trading countries. JEL Classification: F13, F18, Q53