短视的货币政策和总统权力:为什么规则很重要

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cato Journal Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI:10.36009/CJ.39.3.5
J. Dorn
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在缺乏货币规则的情况下,央行很容易受到政治化的影响。以美国为例,国会于1913年将货币权力下放给美联储,并随着时间的推移扩大了该权力的范围,尤其是在危机之后。然而,国会从来没有制定明确的规则来指导美联储的政策,而且当事情出错时,它总是把美联储当作替罪羊。根据法律规定,美联储有三重使命,即“有效促进就业最大化、物价稳定和经济稳定”
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Myopic Monetary Policy and Presidential Power: Why Rules Matter
In the absence of a monetary rule, a central bank is vulnerable to politicization. In the case of the United States, Congress delegated monetary authority to the Federal Reserve in 1913 and has increased the scope of that authority over time, especially following crises. However, Congress has never enacted an explicit rule to guide Fed policy, and it has used the Fed as a scapegoat when things go awry. By law, the Federal Reserve has a triple mandate to “promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and
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来源期刊
Cato Journal
Cato Journal Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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