Constitutional Courts’ Helpdesk: The Venice Commission’s Advisory Role in Constitutional Adjudication

Abstract This article aims to analyse how constitutional courts make use of advisory opinions of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). Despite that national constitutional courts significantly engage with the advisory work of the Venice Commission, the causes and effects of this engagement remain less explored in constitutional law scholarship. In order to address this gap, this article, from a macro perspective, examines the case law in which the Venice Commission is referred to by constitutional courts, drawn from the Venice Commission’s constitutional adjudication database (CODICES). In addition, appropriate data from the case law of the Constitutional Court of Turkey is examined in particular to expand the scope of the research through micro lens. The article argues that constitutional advice has some advantages for constitutional judges given that it provides a strategic tool for determining reasoning. Despite its non-binding nature, the Venice Commission’s constitutional advice is occasionally considered by constitutional courts, depending on the strategic preferences of the courts, and the judges in a given jurisdiction.