基于视角的聚合如何破坏帕累托原则

IF 1.6 2区 哲学 Q2 ETHICS
I. Sher
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引用次数: 2

摘要

帕累托原则是一种关于偏好的规范性原则,主张一致偏好的一致性。然而,人们有观点,而不仅仅是偏好。评估偏好要求我们了解人们选择偏好的原因,以及偏好产生的整体视角。菲利普·蒙金(Philippe Mongin)认为,当不同的人出于不同的原因持有自己的偏好时,帕累托原则就失去了规范性力量,因此我们必须考虑到原因。这篇文章提倡我们考虑人们更广阔的视角。我认为,当人们通过汇总一系列标准来形成自己的偏好时,那么直接考虑这些标准,并考虑人们持有的更广泛的观点和原则,自然会导致违反帕累托原则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How perspective-based aggregation undermines the Pareto principle
The Pareto principle is a normative principle about preferences that advocates concordance with unanimous preference. However, people have perspectives not just preferences. Evaluating preferences requires that we understand the reasons that people have for them and the overall perspectives from which they arise. Philippe Mongin has argued that the Pareto principle loses its normative force when different people hold their preferences for different reasons so that we must take reasons into account. This article advocates that we take people’s broader perspectives into account. I argue that when people form their preferences by aggregating a collection of criteria, then taking these criteria directly into account and considering the broader perspectives and principles held by people will naturally lead to violations of the Pareto principle.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
20
期刊介绍: Politics, Philosophy & Economics aims to bring moral, economic and political theory to bear on the analysis, justification and criticism of political and economic institutions and public policies. The Editors are committed to publishing peer-reviewed papers of high quality using various methodologies from a wide variety of normative perspectives. They seek to provide a distinctive forum for discussions and debates among political scientists, philosophers, and economists on such matters as constitutional design, property rights, distributive justice, the welfare state, egalitarianism, the morals of the market, democratic socialism, population ethics, and the evolution of norms.
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