Konstantinos Charistos, Ioannis N. Pinopoulos, Panagiotis Skartados
{"title":"被动正向所有权和上游串通","authors":"Konstantinos Charistos, Ioannis N. Pinopoulos, Panagiotis Skartados","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3924078","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effects of passive forward ownership on the sustainability of upstream collusion. We consider a homogeneous Cournot duopoly with competing vertical chains. In one chain, the upstream firm has non-controlling partial ownership over its downstream exclusive client. We find that passive forward ownership hinders upstream collusion; the higher is the degree of ownership, the more difficult it is for upstream collusion to be sustained. The driving force behind our result is that a higher degree of passive forward ownership decreases collusive profits of the unintegrated upstream firm.","PeriodicalId":18516,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Production","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Passive forward ownership and upstream collusion\",\"authors\":\"Konstantinos Charistos, Ioannis N. Pinopoulos, Panagiotis Skartados\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3924078\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We examine the effects of passive forward ownership on the sustainability of upstream collusion. We consider a homogeneous Cournot duopoly with competing vertical chains. In one chain, the upstream firm has non-controlling partial ownership over its downstream exclusive client. We find that passive forward ownership hinders upstream collusion; the higher is the degree of ownership, the more difficult it is for upstream collusion to be sustained. The driving force behind our result is that a higher degree of passive forward ownership decreases collusive profits of the unintegrated upstream firm.\",\"PeriodicalId\":18516,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Microeconomics: Production\",\"volume\":\"45 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Microeconomics: Production\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3924078\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Microeconomics: Production","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3924078","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effects of passive forward ownership on the sustainability of upstream collusion. We consider a homogeneous Cournot duopoly with competing vertical chains. In one chain, the upstream firm has non-controlling partial ownership over its downstream exclusive client. We find that passive forward ownership hinders upstream collusion; the higher is the degree of ownership, the more difficult it is for upstream collusion to be sustained. The driving force behind our result is that a higher degree of passive forward ownership decreases collusive profits of the unintegrated upstream firm.
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