{"title":"论意图、倾向和规范约束","authors":"Matteo Negro","doi":"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.236","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In order to safeguard the link between rationality and happiness, first of all we have to recognize that this link is not anchored in the first place to the level of the particular action and its external contraints, but to the level of disposition. Particular choices in fact are rational in that they express and manifest a rational disposition to choose, which gives form and unity to the actions themselves. The alternative is a theory of rationality as a causal theory of choice.","PeriodicalId":41386,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Inquiries","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Some remarks on Intentions, Dispositions, and Normative Constraints\",\"authors\":\"Matteo Negro\",\"doi\":\"10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.236\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In order to safeguard the link between rationality and happiness, first of all we have to recognize that this link is not anchored in the first place to the level of the particular action and its external contraints, but to the level of disposition. Particular choices in fact are rational in that they express and manifest a rational disposition to choose, which gives form and unity to the actions themselves. The alternative is a theory of rationality as a causal theory of choice.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41386,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophical Inquiries\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophical Inquiries\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.236\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Inquiries","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4454/PHILINQ.V7I2.236","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Some remarks on Intentions, Dispositions, and Normative Constraints
In order to safeguard the link between rationality and happiness, first of all we have to recognize that this link is not anchored in the first place to the level of the particular action and its external contraints, but to the level of disposition. Particular choices in fact are rational in that they express and manifest a rational disposition to choose, which gives form and unity to the actions themselves. The alternative is a theory of rationality as a causal theory of choice.
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