Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine?

Almost two years after the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013, the increasing number of asymmetric terrorist attacks targeting UN peacekeepers – in the context of a drawn-out peace process – has raised a number of questions in Mali, the sub-region, and in New York, over the relevance and adequacies of MINUSMA’s mandate and capabilities. It also raises a broader issue, of whether the consent-based UN peacekeeping tool is appropriate and can be effective in carrying out stabilization mandates in such a context and what doctrine such operations should be based on. The UN is indeed under increasing pressure from host countries and some African troop-contributing countries to go on the offensive. Member States have also increasingly recognized terrorism and organized crime as a strategic threat, and while opposed to the UN directly engaging in counterterrorism (CT) operations, some may wish to see the UN playing a greater stabilization role following the January 2013 French military intervention in Mali. However, little guidance and means have been given so far to UN missions for dealing with such threats and implementing effective stabilization mandates. The High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, which recently released its report, noted that the usage of the term “stabilization” by the UN requires clarification. This article analyses the complex and evolving nature of threats in northern Mali and implications for MINUSMA and describes the military and political tools – including mediation – so far available within and outside the UN. The article concludes that the UN is bound to move towards stabilization when and if deployed in contexts such as Mali’s if it wants to remain relevant. However, such a move should be based on an overarching UN stabilization doctrine and context-specific UN-wide stabilization strategies which are first and foremost political, and should not be confused with the reestablishment of state authority. Such a move should also be accompanied by reforms in the design of ‘lighter’ but more capable UN operations, and partnership with non-UN parallel fighting forces with shared stabilization objectives, but with a clear division of labor