平台定价选择:独家交易或统一价格

IF 0.9 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Review of Network Economics Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI:10.1515/rne-2017-0016

Shiva Shekhar

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引用次数: 3

摘要

在内容提供商可以多户或单户的情况下，平台可以选择向内容提供商提供独家交易或统一价格。我们发现，平台为足够大或足够小的独立利益价值提供独家交易。对于足够大或足够小的独立收益，多用户对单用户的比例相对较大或较小，排他性交易允许更有效地从市场中相对较大的内容提供商类型中提取。因此，不管竞争平台选择何种定价策略，采用独家交易变得更加有利可图。我们发现，当独立收益足够小时，排他性交易均衡也是行业利润增强的结果。另一方面，当独立收益很大时，排他性定价交易均衡会导致囚徒困境类型的结果。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Platform Pricing Choice: Exclusive Deals or Uniform Prices

Abstract Platforms choose between offering exclusive deals or uniform prices to content providers in a setting where content providers can multi-home or single-home. We find that platforms offer exclusive deals for sufficiently large or sufficiently small values of standalone benefits. For sufficiently large or small standalone benefits, there are relatively large or small proportion of multi-homers to single-homers, exclusive deals allow to extract more efficiently from the content provider type that is relatively large in the market. Hence, it becomes more lucrative to employ exclusive deals regardless of the pricing strategy chosen by rival platform. We find that for standalone benefits being sufficiently small, exclusive deals equilibrium is also the industry profit enhancing outcome. On the other hand, when standalone benefits are large, exclusive pricing deals equilibrium leads to a prisoner’s dilemma type of outcome.

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来源期刊

Review of Network Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Network Economics seeks to help policy makers, academics, and practitioners keep informed of new research and policy debate in network economics and related subjects that are relevant to the study of network industries. By publishing high quality research on topical issues relevant to network industries, it is hoped readers will be able to gain a deeper understanding of the economic issues involved and that this will improve the quality of decision making by private and public organisations, and debate among researchers. The articles can cover specific network industries, or may deal with general issues that have relevance to a number of different network industries, including topics in the economics of networks, regulation, competition law, or industrial organisation. Papers that provide insights into policy debates are especially welcome, as are up-to-date surveys, book reviews, and comments.