当隐形一体化与公共安全相遇:欧盟外国直接投资审查规则

IF 0.6 Q2 LAW
T. Verellen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

《欧盟外商直接投资审查条例》(以下简称《条例》)是“潜行整合”理论在投资审查领域的有趣应用。该条例在某种意义上导致了一体化,即欧盟委员会首次被授予在欧盟内部投资审查过程中的作用。然而,委员会参与的代价是同时加强了成员国审查当局的权力,导致了不理想的政策结果,即委员会和成员国可能都没有必要的工具来迅速和彻底地审查投资,而这是维持开放的投资环境所必需的。该条例的缺点很可能引发进一步改革的呼声。为了展开这一论点,本文(1)从法律上考察了该法规的主要特征,(2)探讨了该法规与欧盟自由流动规则的相互作用。这篇文章解释了该条例如何可能有助于国家审查决定的吸收,但没有增加欧盟委员会或欧盟法院的执法机会。这就造成了执法上的空白,这可能会对现有的自由流动框架施加压力,并可能会鼓励成员国发展一个国家,而不是一个共同的欧盟公共安全和秩序概念。欧盟法、欧洲一体化、外国直接投资审查、资本自由流动、设立自由、投资自由化、功能主义、新功能主义、欧盟法院、共同商业政策、法治、司法保护、执法
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When Integration by Stealth Meets Public Security: The EU Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation
The EU FDI Screening Regulation (the Regulation) is an interesting application of the ‘integration by stealth’ theory to the sphere of investment screening. The Regulation leads to integration in the sense that, for the first time, the Commission is granted a role in the process of investment screening within the EU. However, Commission involvement comes at the cost of simultaneously strengthening the hands of the Member State screening authorities, leading to a suboptimal policy outcome whereby neither the Commission nor the Member States may have at their disposal the necessary tools to screen investments quickly and thoroughly, as is required to maintain an open investment environment. The shortcomings of the Regulation are likely to trigger calls for further reform. To develop this argument, this article (1) legally examines the main features of the Regulation and (2) explores the interplay of the Regulation with EU free movement rules. The article explains how the Regulation is likely to contribute to an uptake in national screening decisions, but not to a concomitant increase in enforcement opportunities for the Commission or the Court of Justice of the EU. This creates an enforcement gap, which may put pressure on the existing free movement framework and may risk encouraging Member States to develop a national as opposed to a common EU conception of public security and order. European Union law, European integration, foreign direct investment screening, free movement of capital, freedom of establishment, investment liberalization, functionalism, neo-functionalism, Court of Justice of the European Union, common commercial policy, rule of law, judicial protection, enforcement
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
5
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