隐藏还是揭露?在和平时期竞争中管理秘密军事能力

IF 4.8 1区社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Security Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.1162/isec_a_00367

B. Green, A. Long

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引用次数: 12

摘要

国际政治结果深受权力平衡的影响，但一些军事能力依赖于保密才能发挥作用。这些“秘密能力”给将军事优势转化为政治利益带来了问题。如果秘密能力被揭露，对手可能会采取措施削弱他们应该提供的优势。另一方面，如果这些能力没有被揭示出来，那么对手将不知道，也不会对真正的力量平衡印象深刻。大多数现有文献都强调，各国几乎没有动机表明自己的秘密能力。这个结论值得补充:长期和平时期竞争的条件可以使信号成为有利可图的决策。在这种情况下，两个重要的变量有助于确定一个国家是将表明还是隐藏其秘密能力:能力的独特性和对手的预期反应。冷战战略反潜战的扩展案例研究证实了这些预测。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Conceal or Reveal? Managing Clandestine Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition

Abstract International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective. These “clandestine capabilities” pose problems for converting military advantages into political gains. If clandestine capabilities are revealed, adversaries may be able to take steps that attenuate the advantages they are supposed to provide. On the other hand, if these capabilities are not revealed, then adversaries will be unaware of, and unimpressed by, the real balance of power. Most of the existing literature emphasizes that states have few incentives to signal their clandestine capabilities. This conclusion deserves qualification: the condition of long-term peacetime competition can make signaling a profitable decision. Within this context, two important variables help determine whether a state will signal or conceal its secret capabilities: the uniqueness of the capability and the anticipated responsiveness of the adversary. An extended case study of Cold War strategic antisubmarine warfare confirms these predictions.

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来源期刊

International Security Social Sciences-Law

CiteScore

7.40

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.