病人的需求导致处方药的过度使用吗?

IF 5.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Journal-Applied Economics Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.1257/app.20190722

C. Lopez, A. Sautmann, Simone Schaner

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引用次数: 2

摘要

在马里的一项实验中，我们测试了患者是否会向医生施压，让他们开出不必要的医疗处方。我们改变了患者关于抗疟疾药片折扣的信息，并测量了对药片和更昂贵的抗疟疾注射的需求。我们发现了患者驱动需求的证据:告知患者有关折扣的信息，而不是让提供者决定共享这些信息，使折扣的使用增加了35%，总体疟疾治疗增加了10%。这些边缘病人很少患疟疾，这使得疾病与治疗的匹配更加糟糕。供应商没有利用信息优势来销售注射剂——在两种信息条件下，他们的使用率都下降了。(jel 83, i11, i12, o15)

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Does Patient Demand Contribute to the Overuse of Prescription Drugs?

In an experiment in Mali, we tested whether patients pressure providers to prescribe unnecessary medical treatment. We varied patients’ information about a discount for antimalarial tablets and measure demand for both tablets and costlier antimalarial injections. We find evidence of patient-driven demand: informing patients about the discount, instead of letting providers decide to share this information, increased discount use by 35 percent and overall malaria treatment by 10 percent. These marginal patients rarely had malaria, worsening the illness-treatment match. Providers did not use the information advantage to sell injections—their use fell in both information conditions. (JEL D83, I11, I12, O15)

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来源期刊

American Economic Journal-Applied Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

9.10

自引率

1.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： American Economic Journal: Applied Economics publishes papers covering a range of topics in applied economics, with a focus on empirical microeconomic issues. In particular, we welcome papers on labor economics, development microeconomics, health, education, demography, empirical corporate finance, empirical studies of trade, and empirical behavioral economics.