对法国法律下引入股东驱逐的“马克龙”法草案的宪法审查:没有发生的革命

IF 0.6 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Sophie Vermeille, Jérémy Martinez, F. Papon
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引用次数: 8

摘要

为了使法国经济现代化,法国经济部长埃马纽埃尔·马克龙今年早些时候通过了一项全面的法律,改革了法国商业法的许多领域,包括破产法,这在政治上存在争议。根据法国法律,在某些情况下,在不违反股东义务的情况下,首次可以将股东驱逐出影响陷入困境的公司未来的决策。这项法律是朝着正确方向迈出的一步,迫使股东承担公司的损失,并允许新股东投入新的资金。不幸的是,法国政府未能运用现代的、世界级的经济标准来管理新法律规定的股东驱逐行为。首先,通过保留一个过时的流动性危机触发机制,而不是实际破产,法律未能考虑公司的企业价值(“持续经营价值”)作为承认股票已经变得一文不值的适当经济基础,这是为驱逐股票提供合法性并避免违宪侵犯财产权风险的必要因素。其次,该法律要求法官通过找到“公共需要”来证明驱逐行为的正当性,以避免“严重经济损失”的风险,这对财产权提供了薄弱的宪法保障,对公共利益标准的定义很松散,对法官避免武断裁决和政治干预的指导也很少。不幸的是,由于缺乏经济和概念基础,改革法国法律的真正尝试变成了不充分和可能违宪的新法律。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Constitutional Review of the Draft 'Macron' Law Introducing Shareholder Eviction under French Law: The Revolution that Didn't Happen
In a politically controversial attempt to modernize the French economy, French Minister of the Economy Emmanuel Macron passed a sweeping law earlier this year, reforming many areas of French business law, including bankruptcy law. For the first time under French law shareholder eviction will be available - under certain circumstances and without any breach of the shareholder’s duties - to remove them from decisions affecting the future of a distressed company. This law is a step in the right direction to force shareholders to absorb the company’s losses and allow new shareholders to invest fresh money. Unfortunately, the French government failed to use modern, world-class economic standards to govern a shareholder eviction under the new law. First, by retaining an antiquated trigger of liquidity crisis instead of actual insolvency, the law fails to consider the enterprise value of the company (the "going concern value") as the proper economic basis to recognize that shares have become worthless, an essential element to provide legitimacy for their eviction and avoid the risk of an unconstitutional violation of property rights. Second, by requiring that a judge justify the eviction by finding a "public necessity" to avoid a risk of "serious loss to the economy", the law offers a weak constitutional safeguard for property rights, a loosely defined public interest standard and little guidance for a judge to avoid arbitrary decisions and political interferences. This lack of economic and conceptual basis has unfortunately transformed a genuine attempt to reform French law into an inadequate and potentially unconstitutional new law.
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