两期两梯次供应链中在线评论对定价策略和协调的影响

IF 1.1 4区计算机科学 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Infor Pub Date : 2022-03-21 DOI:10.1080/03155986.2022.2049154

Haijiao Li, Kuan Yang, Guoqing Zhang

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引用次数: 3

摘要

在线评论在消费者的购买决策中起着重要的作用，引起了企业的广泛关注。虽然之前的调查已经探讨了在线评论对公司经营决策的影响，但很少有人知道评论的数量和价格如何影响渠道结构中不同参与者的经营决策。本文建立了博弈论模型，考察了两期集中式、分散式和由在线零售商和制造商组成的协调结构下，评论量和价格对不同参与者定价策略的影响。结果表明，零售商和制造商受益于高评价价，但不一定受到低评价价的损害。特别是当评论量足够大时，低评论价也可能带来更多的利润。在这种情况下，在线评论可以扩大潜在市场。最后，在一定条件下，两期两部分关税合同可以很好地协调供应链，实现零售商和制造商的双赢。制造商可以收取足够低的第一期批发价格，甚至在低价和中等数量的评论下补贴零售商。我们的研究结果对供应链管理中评审的含义提供了更全面的理解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The impact of online reviews on pricing strategy and coordination in a two-period two-echelon supply chain

Abstract Online reviews have attracted much attention from firms as they play a significant role in consumers' purchase decisions. While prior investigations have explored the impact of online reviews on firms' operational decisions, little is known about how review volume and valence affect different players' operational decisions in a channel structure. We develop game-theoretic models to examine the effect of review volume and valence on different players' pricing strategies under two-period centralized, decentralized, and coordination structures composed of an online retailer and a manufacturer. The results indicate that the retailer and manufacturer benefit from a high review valence but are not necessarily harmed by a low review valence. Particularly, when review volume is sufficiently large, the low review valence may also bring more profits. In this case, online reviews can expand the potential market. Finally, a two-period two-part tariff contract can perfectly coordinate the supply chain and create a win-win situation for both the retailer and manufacturer under certain conditions. The manufacturer may charge a sufficiently low first-period wholesale price and even subsidize the retailer under a low valence and moderate number of reviews. Our results offer a more complete understanding of the implications of reviews in supply chain management.

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来源期刊

Infor 管理科学-计算机：信息系统

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

7.70%

发文量

审稿时长

>12 weeks

期刊介绍： INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research is published and sponsored by the Canadian Operational Research Society. It provides its readers with papers on a powerful combination of subjects: Information Systems and Operational Research. The importance of combining IS and OR in one journal is that both aim to expand quantitative scientific approaches to management. With this integration, the theory, methodology, and practice of OR and IS are thoroughly examined. INFOR is available in print and online.