Changes in U.S. Security and Defense Strategy toward China: Assessment and Policy Implications

This study analyzes American defense and security strategy towards China and assesses its policy impact on security on the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The rapid rise of the People’s Republic of China as a geopolitical power and its aggressive foreign policy has considerably heightened fears among U.S. policymakers that China poses a threat. The intensifying strategic rivalry and distrust between Washington and Beijing since the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump in 2017 is leading to worsened relations between the two countries. This trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, and it is also expected that the American grand strategy will view China as the new global adversary, drawing down the “War on Terror” in the process. China is indeed fast emerging as the target of sustained deterrence, and this shift in American strategic thinking will likely continue even after the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. Intensifying Sino-American geopolitical competition is resulting in a new Cold War posture, reflecting in turn a lack of strategic dialogue. As a result, the risk of Sino-American military conflict in geopolitical hotspots around the world (including the Korean Peninsula) is rapidly increasing, and countries in the region are worried about being entangled in a Great Power conflict between the two countries. In the meantime, the United States is soliciting countries in the region to join an “anti-Beijing” grouping of sorts, seeking to integrate pre-existing alliances (e.g., the ROK-U.S. Alliance) into this new grouping. Beijing, for its part, is attempting to weaken those traditional alliances with Washington, through measures such as economic coercion. Seoul is bearing the brunt of such sustained pressure from Beijing and is being pressured by both countries to “pick” one side over the other. Practically speaking, rather than pick sides, Seoul ought to chart a middle course, proceeding with “strategic confidence” that draws on a clear delineation of national interest and backing of the South Korean public. In particular, it would behoove Seoul to provide opportunities for deliberation on Korean Peninsula security issues, enhancing the prospects for meaningful strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Concurrently, Seoul would also benefit from vigilant monitoring of the changing balance of power between United States and China, utilizing insights drawn from keen monitoring to further enhance its defense capabilities. In so doing, it is expected that Seoul will enhance its strategic value and military deterrence capabilities. Concurrently, by way of proactive military-to-military diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, cooperative deterrence capabilities also would have to be significantly enhanced.