{"title":"海勒案中隐藏的外法之争:美国宪法中的比例主义取向","authors":"M. Cohen-Eliya, Iddo Porat","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1317833","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"District of Columbia v. Heller, pertaining to gun control, was addressed by a deluge of articles. However, one important point has been overlooked by commentators: the fact that Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, used the term \"proportionality approach\" to describe American case law. Proportionality, which essentially requires that rights infringement be proportional to government ends, is the most dominant doctrine in constitutional adjudication in Europe, as well as in an increasing number of countries outside Europe. Interestingly, however, not a single foreign legal authority was cited by Breyer. This could represent a shift in strategy regarding the use of foreign law in American adjudication. Instead of introducing foreign law doctrines in a direct manner, an attempt is made to give them American credentials, thus preventing any criticism over the infiltration of foreign elements into American law. In this article we take note of this shift in strategy in the context of the foreign law debate and we then question of the validity of Breyer's reference to \"proportionality\" for describing American constitutional law. We argue that Justice Breyer was correct in his contention that a doctrinal framework which is very similar to proportionality is embedded in American constitutional law, namely that of balancing. However, we argue that Breyer has missed noting the important divergence between the respective positions of proportionality and balancing in the American and European legal systems, which stem from their very different historical, cultural, and institutional backgrounds. We also raise the question whether by tossing the term \"proportionality\" into the American constitutional lexicon Breyer may not have had another aim in mind, namely to create a framework which would bring American constitutional law closer to the thinking and method of operation of European constitutional law. Arguably, such a move should have been done more openly, by making the reference to foreign law explicit rather than implicit.","PeriodicalId":83257,"journal":{"name":"The San Diego law review","volume":"46 1","pages":"367"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.1317833","citationCount":"19","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law\",\"authors\":\"M. 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引用次数: 19
摘要
有关枪支管制的哥伦比亚特区诉海勒案(District Columbia v. Heller)被大量文章提及。然而,评论家们忽视了一个重要的问题:布雷耶法官在他的反对意见中使用了“相称性方法”一词来描述美国判例法。比例原则,本质上要求侵犯权利与政府目的成正比,是欧洲宪法裁决中最主要的原则,在欧洲以外越来越多的国家也是如此。然而,有趣的是,布雷耶没有引用任何外国法律权威。这可能代表了在美国审判中使用外国法的策略的转变。美国没有直接引进外国法律理论,而是试图赋予其美国资格,从而避免了对外国因素渗透到美国法律中的任何批评。在本文中,我们将在外国法辩论的背景下注意到这种策略的转变,然后我们将质疑布雷耶在描述美国宪法时提到的“相称性”的有效性。我们认为,布雷耶法官的论点是正确的,他认为美国宪法中嵌入了一个与比例原则非常相似的理论框架,即平衡原则。然而,我们认为布雷耶没有注意到美国和欧洲法律体系中相称性和平衡性各自立场之间的重要分歧,这种分歧源于它们非常不同的历史、文化和制度背景。我们还提出了一个问题,布雷耶将“相称性”一词扔进美国宪法词典,是否可能没有另一个目的,即创造一个框架,使美国宪法更接近欧洲宪法的思维和运作方法。可以说,这样的举动应该更公开地进行,明确而不是含蓄地提及外国法。
The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law
District of Columbia v. Heller, pertaining to gun control, was addressed by a deluge of articles. However, one important point has been overlooked by commentators: the fact that Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, used the term "proportionality approach" to describe American case law. Proportionality, which essentially requires that rights infringement be proportional to government ends, is the most dominant doctrine in constitutional adjudication in Europe, as well as in an increasing number of countries outside Europe. Interestingly, however, not a single foreign legal authority was cited by Breyer. This could represent a shift in strategy regarding the use of foreign law in American adjudication. Instead of introducing foreign law doctrines in a direct manner, an attempt is made to give them American credentials, thus preventing any criticism over the infiltration of foreign elements into American law. In this article we take note of this shift in strategy in the context of the foreign law debate and we then question of the validity of Breyer's reference to "proportionality" for describing American constitutional law. We argue that Justice Breyer was correct in his contention that a doctrinal framework which is very similar to proportionality is embedded in American constitutional law, namely that of balancing. However, we argue that Breyer has missed noting the important divergence between the respective positions of proportionality and balancing in the American and European legal systems, which stem from their very different historical, cultural, and institutional backgrounds. We also raise the question whether by tossing the term "proportionality" into the American constitutional lexicon Breyer may not have had another aim in mind, namely to create a framework which would bring American constitutional law closer to the thinking and method of operation of European constitutional law. Arguably, such a move should have been done more openly, by making the reference to foreign law explicit rather than implicit.