{"title":"个人作为国际法的主体","authors":"M. Janis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1101693","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Legal positivism has long provided the usual theory for comprehending international law. The typical positivist definition of international law is grounded on a subject-based differentiation between international and municipal rules. Positivism views international law as a set of rules with states as its subjects. Municipal law is thought of as pertaining to individuals who are subjects of a single state. This Article rejects the positivist subject based approach to international law and calls for a definition of the discipline that recognizes individuals as subjects of international law. This Article is divided into three parts. First, it briefly reviews the development of the positivist theory of international law. Second, it tests the subject-based approach against some realities of international practice and shows that international law actually has long involved individual rights and obligations. Finally, it suggests that a different, albeit older, theoretical foundation for international law may be a better way to encompass individuals as subjects of international law.","PeriodicalId":45714,"journal":{"name":"CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2008-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.1101693","citationCount":"18","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Individuals as Subjects of International Law\",\"authors\":\"M. Janis\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.1101693\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Legal positivism has long provided the usual theory for comprehending international law. The typical positivist definition of international law is grounded on a subject-based differentiation between international and municipal rules. Positivism views international law as a set of rules with states as its subjects. Municipal law is thought of as pertaining to individuals who are subjects of a single state. This Article rejects the positivist subject based approach to international law and calls for a definition of the discipline that recognizes individuals as subjects of international law. This Article is divided into three parts. First, it briefly reviews the development of the positivist theory of international law. Second, it tests the subject-based approach against some realities of international practice and shows that international law actually has long involved individual rights and obligations. Finally, it suggests that a different, albeit older, theoretical foundation for international law may be a better way to encompass individuals as subjects of international law.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45714,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-03-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.1101693\",\"citationCount\":\"18\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1101693\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1101693","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Legal positivism has long provided the usual theory for comprehending international law. The typical positivist definition of international law is grounded on a subject-based differentiation between international and municipal rules. Positivism views international law as a set of rules with states as its subjects. Municipal law is thought of as pertaining to individuals who are subjects of a single state. This Article rejects the positivist subject based approach to international law and calls for a definition of the discipline that recognizes individuals as subjects of international law. This Article is divided into three parts. First, it briefly reviews the development of the positivist theory of international law. Second, it tests the subject-based approach against some realities of international practice and shows that international law actually has long involved individual rights and obligations. Finally, it suggests that a different, albeit older, theoretical foundation for international law may be a better way to encompass individuals as subjects of international law.
期刊介绍:
Founded in 1967, the Cornell International Law Journal is one of the oldest and most prominent international law journals in the country. Three times a year, the Journal publishes scholarship that reflects the sweeping changes that are taking place in public and private international law. Two of the issues feature articles by legal scholars, practitioners, and participants in international politics as well as student-written notes. The third issue is dedicated to publishing papers generated by the Journal"s annual Symposium, held every spring in Ithaca, New York.