行政程序中的直接共和主义

IF 1.6 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
D. Arkush
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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文为行政法中的一个老问题提供了一个新的回应:如何从非选举产生的监管者那里确保健全的、民主合法的政策。这个问题源于代议制政府固有的委托-代理问题——政府官员可能不会按照公众的最佳利益行事——在法律和政策辩论中很少缺席。近年来,随着各机构实施新法律并调整旧法律,法院审查其行为,白宫和国会就监管改革提案进行辩论,重大监管失误和政府对此的反应重新焕发了其重要性。行政法中民主合法性的传统模式侧重于机构对当选官员的问责,或增加利益集团对监管过程的参与。这些模型很有价值,但最终还是有不足之处,很大程度上是因为它们的代表性只是复制了核心的委托代理问题,而不是补救问题。最近,一些学者和改革者试图让公民直接参与监管过程。但是,这些努力并没有避免以代表制为基础的问题,它们还受到直接民主的高成本和其他复杂因素的影响,而直接民主有利于代议制的政府形式。本文介绍了一种新的民主合法性模式,即“直接共和主义”,它试图将代议制和直接方法的元素结合起来。在直接共和制度中,由随机挑选的大批公民组成的小组决定政府官员向他们提出的政策问题。通过这种方式,公民可以充当自己的代表,校长可以充当自己的代理人。这篇文章以“行政陪审团”的形式概述了直接共和主义在监管过程中的初步应用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process
This Article offers a new response to an old problem in administrative law: how to secure sound, democratically legitimate policies from unelected regulators. The question stems from a principal-agent problem inherent in representative forms of government — the possibility that government officials will not act in the public’s best interests — and it is rarely absent from legal and policy debates. Major regulatory failures and the government’s responses to them have renewed its significance in recent years, as agencies implement new laws and adapt old ones, courts review their actions, and the White House and Congress debate proposals for regulatory reform. Traditional models of democratic legitimacy in administrative law focus on agency accountability to elected officials or increasing interest group participation in the regulatory process. These models are valuable but ultimately fall short, largely because their representative nature replicates rather than remedies the core principal-agent problem. More recently, some scholars and reformers have attempted to engage citizens directly in the regulatory process. But these efforts have not circumvented the representation-based problems, and they also suffer from the high costs and other complications of direct democracy that counsel in favor of representative forms of government. This Article introduces a new model for democratic legitimacy, "direct republicanism," which attempts to combine elements of representative and direct approaches. In a direct republican system, large panels of randomly selected citizens decide policy questions presented to them by government officials. In this way, citizens can act as their own representatives, the principals their own agents. The Article sketches an initial application of direct republicanism to the regulatory process in the form of "administrative juries."
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
2
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