无损失买家存在下噪声认证的盈利能力*

IF 1.7 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Seung Huh, Dmitry A. Shapiro, Sung H. Ham
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了昂贵的认证技术的不准确如何影响垄断卖家的盈利能力。我们比较了三种情况:无认证、100%准确的认证和50%准确的认证,它们在一半时间内产生准确的评估。嘈杂的认证环境从来都不是最有利可图的,根据买家对损失的厌恶程度,可能是最不有利可图的。然而,嘈杂的认证可能比准确的认证更有利可图,因为它不鼓励在准确的认证环境中发生过度认证。实验表明,噪声认证是最不有利可图的处理方法,而准确认证是最有利可图的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Profitability of Noisy Certification in the Presence of Loss Averse Buyers*

We study how the inaccuracy of a costly certification technology affects a monopolistic seller's profitability. We compare three scenarios: no certification, a 100% accurate certification, and a 50% accurate certification that produces accurate evaluations half the time. The noisy certification environment is never the most profitable and, depending on the buyers' loss aversion, can be the least profitable. However, a noisy certification can be more profitable than an accurate one, as it discourages the over-certification that occurs in an accurate certification environment. Experimentally, the noisy certification is shown to be the least profitable treatment, whereas the accurate certification is shown to be the most profitable.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.
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