重复游戏中的监控与折扣

IF 6.6 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Econometrica Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI:10.3982/ECTA20206

Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究了折扣和监控如何共同决定在不完善（公共或私人）监控的重复游戏中是否可能合作。我们的主要结果提供了玩家激励强度的简单界限，作为折扣、监控精度和路径上回报方差的函数。我们通过建立一个公共监测民间定理，证明了低贴现/低监测双重极限的界是紧的，其中贴现因子和监测结构可以同时变化。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games

We study how discounting and monitoring jointly determine whether cooperation is possible in repeated games with imperfect (public or private) monitoring. Our main result provides a simple bound on the strength of players' incentives as a function of discounting, monitoring precision, and on-path payoff variance. We show that the bound is tight in the low-discounting/low-monitoring double limit, by establishing a public-monitoring folk theorem where the discount factor and the monitoring structure can vary simultaneously.

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来源期刊

Econometrica 社会科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

11.00

自引率

3.30%

发文量

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： Econometrica publishes original articles in all branches of economics - theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage across the subject area. It promotes studies that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics each year - from the frontier of theoretical developments in many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in econometrics. Econometrica maintains a long tradition that submitted articles are refereed carefully and that detailed and thoughtful referee reports are provided to the author as an aid to scientific research, thus ensuring the high calibre of papers found in Econometrica. An international board of editors, together with the referees it has selected, has succeeded in substantially reducing editorial turnaround time, thereby encouraging submissions of the highest quality. We strongly encourage recent Ph. D. graduates to submit their work to Econometrica. Our policy is to take into account the fact that recent graduates are less experienced in the process of writing and submitting papers.