基于强度的排放定价收入回扣

IF 3.1 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Christoph Böhringer, C. Fischer, N. Rivers
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引用次数: 1

摘要

全球范围内的碳定价政策越来越多地与直接或间接补贴相结合,排放定价收入被重新分配给受监管实体。这项研究分析了两种奖励额外减排强度的新形式的回扣所产生的激励措施:一种是按产出比例给予的(基于强度的产出回扣),另一种是回扣部分排放付款的(基于密度的排放回扣)。这些形式与基于产出的再贴现、基于减排的再贴现和一次性再贴现形成对比。在相同的排放价格下,基于强度的产出再评级激励了最大的强度削减,而基于减排的再评级导致了最大的产出削减,基于产出的再评级对产出(和排放)的压力最小;基于强度的排放再贴现介于两者之间,通过隐含地补贴排放,同时激励强度降低。该研究用数值模拟补充了部分均衡理论分析,以评估多部门一般均衡模型中不同机制的性能,该模型考虑了整个经济体的市场互动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Intensity-Based Rebating of Emission Pricing Revenues
Carbon-pricing policies worldwide are increasingly coupled with direct or indirect subsidies where emissions pricing revenues are rebated to the regulated entities. This study analyzes the incentives created by two novel forms of rebating that reward additional emission intensity reductions: one given in proportion to output (intensity-based output rebating) and another that rebates a share of emission payments (intensity-based emission rebating). These forms are contrasted with output-based rebating, abatement-based rebating, and lump-sum rebating. Given the same emission price, intensity-based output rebating incentivizes the most intensity reductions, while abatement-based rebating causes the most output reductions, and output-based rebating puts the least pressure on output (and emissions); intensity-based emissions rebating lies in between these, by implicitly subsidizing emissions while incentivizing intensity reductions. The study supplements partial equilibrium theoretical analysis with numerical simulations to assess the performance of different mechanisms in a multisector general equilibrium model that accounts for economy-wide market interactions.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.60
自引率
2.80%
发文量
55
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