{"title":"斯宾诺莎的妄想主义","authors":"Federico Bongiorno","doi":"10.1111/papq.12373","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": The Spinozan theory of belieffixation holdsthatmentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I ex- plore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papq.12373","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions\",\"authors\":\"Federico Bongiorno\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/papq.12373\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\": The Spinozan theory of belieffixation holdsthatmentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I ex- plore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47097,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-06-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/papq.12373\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12373\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12373","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
: The Spinozan theory of belieffixation holdsthatmentally representing truth-apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I ex- plore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.
期刊介绍:
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly is a journal of general philosophy in the analytic tradition, publishing original articles from all areas of philosophy including metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, aesthetics and history of philosophy. Periodically, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly publishes special editions devoted to the investigation of important topics in a particular field.