中央银行行长和利率制定委员会

IF 0.8 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2020-12-06 DOI:10.1093/cesifo/ifaa013

Emile van Ommeren, Giulia Piccillo

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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文研究了央行行长在委员会货币政策决策中的作用。为了进行这一分析，我们构建了一个新颖的数据集，记录了六个经合组织国家长达三十年的委员会投票行为。使用一系列泰勒规则规范，我们表明，行长的变化显著影响利率设置。我们还观察到，在任命央行行长的政党不同的情况下，利率规则存在系统性差异，而由右翼政治权威任命的央行行长会出台更多的反通胀政策。我们通过使用更广泛的数据集(包括来自12个国家的3000多个观察结果)来显示这一结果的稳健性。(JEL代码:E02, E5, P16)

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The Central Bank Governor and Interest Rate Setting by Committee

This article studies the role of central bank governors in monetary policy decisions taken by a committee. To carry out this analysis, we constructed a novel dataset of committee voting behaviour for six OECD countries for up to three decades. Using a range of Taylor rule specifications, we show that a change in governor significantly affects interest rate setting. We also observe systematic differences in interest rate rules based on the political party appointing the governor, with more inflation-averse policies under governors that are appointed by a right-wing political authority. We show the robustness of this result by using a wider dataset (including over 3000 observations from 12 countries). (JEL codes: E02, E5, P16)

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来源期刊

Cesifo Economic Studies ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

7.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： CESifo Economic Studies publishes provocative, high-quality papers in economics, with a particular focus on policy issues. Papers by leading academics are written for a wide and global audience, including those in government, business, and academia. The journal combines theory and empirical research in a style accessible to economists across all specialisations.