非正式的政治联盟和中国的私人投资

IF 1.2 3区 社会学 Q2 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY
Jingnan Liu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文试图估计非正式政治联盟对中国私人投资的影响。从理论上讲,预计中国最高领导人的党和国家客户将有更大的动力来促进经济增长。这样做的一种方法是通过降低政治风险来鼓励私人投资。对1993年至2017年省级面板数据的分析表明,省级领导人与现任中国共产党最高领导人之间基于在同一工作单位的共同经验的个人关系显著提高了私人投资的增长率。这表明,非正式制度关系可以通过部分弥补正式法治制度的弱点来帮助中国私营经济的发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
INFORMAL POLITICAL COALITIONS AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN CHINA
Abstract This article attempts to estimate the effects of informal political coalitions on China's private investment. Theoretically, the party-state clients of China's supreme leaders are expected to have stronger incentives to foster economic growth. One way of doing so is to encourage private investment by reducing its political risks. Analysis of provincial-level panel data from 1993 to 2017 shows that personal connections—based on shared experience in the same work unit—between provincial leaders and the Chinese Communist Party's incumbent supreme leader significantly increase the growth rate of private investment. This suggests that informal institutional relations may assist the development of China's private economy by partially compensating for the weaknesses of formal rule-of-law institutions.
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来源期刊
Journal of East Asian Studies
Journal of East Asian Studies SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY-
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
15.40%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: Experts from around the globe come together in this important peer-reviewed forum to present compelling social science research on the entire East Asia region. Topics include democratic governance, military security, political culture, economic cooperation, human rights, and environmental concerns. Thought-provoking book reviews enhance each issue. Want more information information on Journal of East Asian Studies? Sign up for our E-Alerts for regular updates.
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