连续时间不对称信息下的最优动态调节——以电力为例

Q3 Business, Management and Accounting
Juan Carlos Zambrano Jurado, José Gabriel Astaíza Gómez, J. D. García-Racines
{"title":"连续时间不对称信息下的最优动态调节——以电力为例","authors":"Juan Carlos Zambrano Jurado, José Gabriel Astaíza Gómez, J. D. García-Racines","doi":"10.22201/fca.24488410e.2023.4848","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we analyze the mechanism design for the remuneration to the reduction of energy losses of a natural monopoly through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The objective of this research is to characterize the optimal regulation that induces reductions in electrical energy losses. In our methodology, we use a differential equation, its HJB representation, and an exponential utility function. The results suggest that the optimal contract is based on the agent's continuation value as a state variable. The article contributes to the analysis of control problems in conditions of incomplete information and incorporates information asymmetries and incentives in regulation. Among the future lines of research are the application of the model to specific energy markets and the empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed regulation.","PeriodicalId":52100,"journal":{"name":"Contaduria y Administracion","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal dynamic regulation with asymmetric information in continuous time: The case of electric power\",\"authors\":\"Juan Carlos Zambrano Jurado, José Gabriel Astaíza Gómez, J. D. García-Racines\",\"doi\":\"10.22201/fca.24488410e.2023.4848\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this article, we analyze the mechanism design for the remuneration to the reduction of energy losses of a natural monopoly through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The objective of this research is to characterize the optimal regulation that induces reductions in electrical energy losses. In our methodology, we use a differential equation, its HJB representation, and an exponential utility function. The results suggest that the optimal contract is based on the agent's continuation value as a state variable. The article contributes to the analysis of control problems in conditions of incomplete information and incorporates information asymmetries and incentives in regulation. Among the future lines of research are the application of the model to specific energy markets and the empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed regulation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":52100,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Contaduria y Administracion\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Contaduria y Administracion\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22201/fca.24488410e.2023.4848\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Business, Management and Accounting\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Contaduria y Administracion","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22201/fca.24488410e.2023.4848","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文通过连续时间内的动态委托代理模型,分析了自然垄断企业减少能源损失的报酬机制设计。这项研究的目的是描述导致电能损失减少的最佳调节。在我们的方法中,我们使用了一个微分方程、它的HJB表示和一个指数效用函数。结果表明,最优契约是基于代理的连续值作为状态变量的。本文有助于分析不完全信息条件下的控制问题,并将信息不对称和激励纳入监管。未来的研究方向包括将该模型应用于特定的能源市场,以及对拟议监管有效性的实证评估。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal dynamic regulation with asymmetric information in continuous time: The case of electric power
In this article, we analyze the mechanism design for the remuneration to the reduction of energy losses of a natural monopoly through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The objective of this research is to characterize the optimal regulation that induces reductions in electrical energy losses. In our methodology, we use a differential equation, its HJB representation, and an exponential utility function. The results suggest that the optimal contract is based on the agent's continuation value as a state variable. The article contributes to the analysis of control problems in conditions of incomplete information and incorporates information asymmetries and incentives in regulation. Among the future lines of research are the application of the model to specific energy markets and the empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed regulation.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Contaduria y Administracion
Contaduria y Administracion Business, Management and Accounting-Business, Management and Accounting (all)
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
14 weeks
期刊介绍: Contaduría y Administración (Accounting and Management)is a quarterly journal aimed to the academic community. Being peer-reviewed by double blind process,seeks to contribute to the advancement of scientific and technical knowledge in the financial and administrative disciplines. This journal publishes original theoretical or applied research (No case studies, descriptive and exploratory) in Spanish and English on the following subjects: • Organization Management • Production Management and Operations • Human Resources Management • Management of Information Technology • Accounting and Auditing • Management and Leadership • Business Economics • Entrepreneurship • Business Environment • Finance • Operations Research • Innovation and Technological Change in Organizations • Marketing • Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises • Planning and Business Strategies • Management Theory • Financial Theory • Business Decisions Contaduría y Administración (Accounting and Management) also receives research papers on related areas to the above mentioned.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信